THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Royal Commission on Divorce and The M.C.U.[1]

The Modern Churchmen's Union is to be congratulated on the prompt and opportune publication of its *Memoranda* on marriage and divorce submitted to the Royal Commission. The *Memoranda* not only formulate and express the convictions of leading members of the M.C.U. but, what is of more importance, the convictions of the great majority of English churchmen and Free churchmen in this country. If the *Memoranda* do not express the views of the Church Assembly at Westminster that is due to the non-representative character of that body.

The contents of this little volume are as follows:

Foreword by Sir Henry Self, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.B.E., M.Sc., B.D.
Introduction by the Dean of St. Paul's, K.C.V.O., D.D., D.Litt.
The Ideals of Marriage by the Rev. D. E. H. Whiteley, M.A., Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford.
The Doctrine of Marriage in the New Testament by the Rev. P. Gardner-Smith, B.D., Dean and Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge.
The Practice of the Church of England by the Rev. E. F. Carpenter, M.A., Ph.D., Canon of Westminster.
The Present Ecclesiastical Position by the Very Rev. J. H. Cruse, M.A., Provost of Sheffield.

Sir Henry Self in his *Foreword* justifies the publication of the Liberal Church view on the ground that:

> 'It was most improbable that this view would be included in the official evidence submitted on behalf of the Church of England' (p. 3).

[1] *Marriage and Divorce in the Church of England. Memoranda* submitted to the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce by the M.C.U. (2/-, 1952, publishers, M.C.U. Office).

Another reason alleged as justifying publication is the desire

> 'to draw attention to the fundamental dangers underlying the tacit assumption behind current practice in the Church of England that questions relating to marriage and divorce are matters for determination by Ecclesiastical bodies without regard to the views of the laity. Surely the time has passed when the vital questions of modern society can be determined within a closed circle, often dominated by zealous obscurantists?' (p. 3).

Dean Matthews states in his *Introduction* that the *Memoranda* published are in

> 'disagreement on certain points with the point of view of the so-called "official" evidence submitted by the two Archbishops on behalf of the Church of England.'

This Liberal disagreement, however, the Dean is careful to declare, is no expression of disloyalty to the Church of England. He writes:

> 'Let me say then with the utmost emphasis that all those who have collaborated in drawing up this evidence are deeply attached to the Church of England, Catholic and Reformed, and convinced Christians. They differ from other churchmen in that they believe modern knowledge must be taken into account in our understanding of the truth as it is in Christ and that the mind of the Church is intended to go on thinking rather than being content with simply repeating the thoughts of earlier centuries . . . we humbly believe that the Holy Spirit may guide us into new truth, or to new insight into the application of old truth' (p. 5).

The Dean stresses that there is no difference between the aim of Liberal Churchmen and Traditional Churchmen. Both stand for the sanctity and stability of marriage: where they differ is as to the *best means* of realizing this aim.

> 'The teaching which is represented as "official" in the Church of England goes further than this. It lays down that marriage is "indissoluble" in the literal meaning of that word and asserts that only the death of one of the parties can bring the marriage to an end. Thus it follows that, according to this view, divorces granted by the State do not really effect what they pretend to effect; the marriage remains and the remarriage of divorced persons is not truly marriage but a kind of legalized adultery.'

The Dean cogently adds:

> 'We do not believe that the people of this country wish to make a break with the Christian conception of marriage, and at the same time we believe that the rigorous conception of the nature of marriage is doubtfully Christian' (p. 6).
>
> 'We cannot think that all marriages entered into after divorce are wrong . . .'
>
> 'It is easy to state the uncompromising doctrines of absolute indissolubility and no less easy to state the opposite doctrine of secularism——that marriage is a contract like any other and can be brought to an end by the consent of the parties.'

The truth lies between these two extremes.

> 'We do not rest our case on some metaphysical principle of indissolubility which is hard to make intelligible and impossible to prove. We rest it on the idea and intention of marriage which, beyond all controversy, is plainly to be read in the New Testament and which commends itself to the common sense and conscience of the Christian citizen' (p. 7).

The New Testament Doctrine of Marriage

The New Testament teaching on marriage is expounded with critical caution by the Rev. P. Gardner-Smith in the *Memoranda*.

> 'It is clear that the Sayings of Jesus were preserved orally in different churches before the Gospels were composed and that variations soon crept in. Therefore little is to be gained by the quotation of isolated texts' (p. 17).

In interpreting New Testament teaching it must be borne in mind:

(1) That for the primitive Christian Church the Old Testament was 'the Scriptures' and was authoritative.

(2) That in Judaism the state of married women was servile and that the wife could not divorce her husband although the husband had the right to divorce his wife.

(3) In the husband's case adultery consisted in intercourse with another man's wife since for him polygamy and concubinage were not prohibited. When Jesus deepens the Seventh Commandment by affirming that any man who looks on a woman to lust after her breaks the commandment the term 'woman' in this passage must be restricted to a married woman (*Mt.* v, 27, 28; cf. I *Cor.* xiv, 35).

Mr. Gardner-Smith holds that the declaration attributed to Jesus 'Everyone that putteth away his wife and marrieth another committeth adultery' (*Mk.* x, ii; cf. *Lk.* xvi, 18) 'is not open to doubt.' On the other hand the statement in *Mk.* x, 12, which declares a woman commits adultery who divorces her husband and marries another, is held by R. H. Charles, Loisy, etc., to be an addition to the words of Jesus intended for Christians in Rome where this practice was common among women (cf. I *Cor.* vii, 10, 11).

Mr. Gardner-Smith is convinced that Jesus taught that the ideal of marriage is a life-long monogamous union which only death can sever and holds that Matthew's twice repeated 'except for fornication' is a later ecclesiastical addition to the words of Jesus (*Mt.* v, 42 and xix, 9).

As to the Church's practice in regard to marriage after divorce Mr. Gardner-Smith writes :—

> 'As to marriage after divorce, from a very early time some accom modation was made in dealing with hard cases, and before the end c the first century the tradition as to the actual words of Jesus had bee modified to bring His teaching into accord with Jewish law. There every reason to doubt whether the absolute prohibition of remarriag after divorce was ever widely enforced during the first four hundre years. The hesitation of the Church to adopt an uncompromising attitud is not surprising, for it was, and still is, not only concerned to preser to the world the highest ideals of conduct, of which faithfulness i marriage is certainly one, but also to proclaim a gospel of freedom peace, and love, alien to such rigid legislation as must press hardly o many innocent men and women' (p. 26).

Church Policy and Divorce

Canon E. F. Carpenter in an Essay remarkable for its clarity conciseness and comprehensiveness deals with marriage an divorce in the history of the Christian Church, particularly in th Church of England. He emphasizes the important distinctio between the Churches of the East and of the West in the marriage policy.

> 'Throughout the history of the Christian Church there may be four this tension between the ideal and what is regarded as the practical thin to do in a particular situation. In this respect the East and the Wes with their different psychological approach, deal with the problem different ways, though in practice the result was largely the same. Th East, with its greater emphasis on freedom, writes the exception into i laws, and allows divorce and remarriage in certain cases. The West, wi its more legal temper, lays down the rigorist position in absolute term but then develops a subtle legal system which grants exceptions to pa ticular people' (p. 27).

Canon Carpenter concludes his contribution with the well-know verdict of Creighton :

> 'We as Christians abhor divorce; but when a divorce has been judg necessary are we to refuse any liberty to the innocent or wronged party It seems to me a matter of discretion on equitable grounds in each cas I could not advise any of my clergy to refuse to solemnize a marriag of an innocent party who genuinely desired God's blessing. I prefer err on the side of charity' (p. 33).

'The proposed new Canon 38 which prohibits the marriag "according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church o England" of any divorced person whose former spouse is sti living,' as cited by Canon Hudson in the *Times* of Novemb 14th, exhibits no disposition, like Bishop Creighton, 'to err o the side of charity.'

Provost Cruse dealing with the situation in England to-day ates :

> 'It would be generally agreed that the existing facilities for divorce go as far as most liberal opinion in the Church would think desirable. The 1937 Act still protects the "innocent" party, with the one exception of the insane' (p. 39).

he Provost cites the conviction of the Lambeth Conference 1948 art ii, p. 98) which runs as follows :

> 'We believe, therefore, that the Church has a special pastoral duty and responsibility towards those who have contracted another union after divorce—whether they are sinners whose wilfulness or misconduct has wrecked their marriage, or casualties of marriage entered upon "unadvisedly, lightly, or wantonly", as so often in wartime, or the victims of abominable treatment or desertion' (p. 40).

low is this pastoral duty to be carried out? For instance, is a arriage after divorce to be solemnized in church with the rayer Book Marriage Service in the case of the guilty party? he decision rests legally with the parish priest, but it would be ell, if he thinks he ought to refuse the Prayer Book Marriage ervice, to secure beforehand the support of his bishop for this fusal.

Ought married persons with a divorced partner living to be fused admission to Holy Communion? This decision must be ade by the parish priest, who would be well-advised to admit ich persons assuming that they come 'in all good conscience,' r as Provost Cruse concludes :

> 'The Church then does not regard the re-married persons as "open and notorious evil-livers." There is a rejection of the view that they are living a life of adultery.'

Should an incumbent of the 'rigorist' school repel such a erson from Holy Communion, the following legal decisions ould help the incumbent to realize the heavy penalties he may cur should the repelled parishioner decide to take legal action gainst him.

Extracts from the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of Banister Thompson, June 20th, 1912. (Law Cases. Court of Appeal. House of rds. 1912. p. 539 et seq.)

rl Loreburn.

'The rights of parishioners in this matter depend primarily upon statute Edw. VI, c. 1, under which the incumbent of a parish may not, without lawl cause, deny the Holy Communion to any parishioner who would devoutly d humbly desire it.'

'It is inconceivable that any Court of law should allow as a lawful cause e cohabitation of two persons whose union is directly sanctioned by Act of rliament and is as valid as any other marriage within the realm.'

Earl of Halsbury.

'Everybody would have understood, and I think everybody now would understand, what was the meaning of "persons of notorious evil life", and to say that that language is appropriate to these persons, who are legally married and whose marriage is absolutely established by Act of Parliament would, as it seems to me, if it were not so serious a matter, be ludicrous.'

Lord Ashbourne.

'I think that the difficulty of the clergyman would be overwhelming who sought openly in the church to repel, against their respectful protest, from the Holy Table such spouses as "open and notorious evil-livers" on the sole ground that they were living together as man and wife in accordance with the law of the land—it may be after being married in church by another clergyman—and although the congregation, so far from being offended, held them in respect and esteem. It might be that they had been married in the very church and had subsequently on previous occasions without question partaken of the Holy Communion.'

Submission by Sir J. Simon, Solicitor-General, for the respondent, Sir Lewis Dibdin.

In regard to marriage the law of the Church follows the law of the land and those persons are married who are married by the law of the land. Marriage is not a sacrament in the sense that Communion is. It has never been part of the law ecclesiastical that persons who are married by the law of the land are notorious evil-livers.'

Divorce and Disestablishment

An important meeting was held on October 20th in Livingstone Hall, Westminster, under the auspices of the Society for the Study of Religions. Lord Meston presided at the meeting and on the platform with him were Robert S. W. Pollard (Chairman, Marriage Law Reform Society), Mrs. E. M. Watson (Secretary, Divorce Law Reform Union), G. C. Tyndale, Q.C. and the Rev. F. A. Moyle. The object of the meeting was two-fold:

(1) To protest against the Anglo-Catholic campaign which aims at enacting the revision of the Canons so as to secure the virtual excommunication of persons who have re-married after divorce while the divorced partner is still living. There is no need to reiterate here the arguments against the proposed revision as they can be found adequately presented in the M.C.U. *Memoranda.*

(2) The second purpose of the meeting was to stress the danger of Disestablishment threatened by the Anglo-Catholic anti-divorce campaign. This was particularly emphasized by Mr. Pollard, who began by saying: 'I happen to be a Nonconformist, but this controversy concerns the whole English public.

not simply the Church of England.' We are not prepared to tolerate the continued Establishment of so reactionary a national Church. It must lead to the creation of a new Liberation Society whose supporters would include not only secularists, Free Churchmen and Romanists, but also many Anglo-Catholics.

Mr. Moyle in supporting Mr. Pollard said, 'I am nervous about the Establishment.' I hope that Parliament will not be asked to sanction this revision which must split the National Church and lead to its disruption.

At a largely attended meeting of the Chipping Norton Ruridecanal Conference on October 29th, the Rev. T. J. Wood opposed the 'rigorist' policy on divorce and re-marriage expounded by the Rev. H. S. Hutchinson, Proctor in Convocation. The *Oxford Mail* of October 30th reports Mr. Wood as saying:

> He denied that it was the law of the Church that a validly married couple could not be divorced with the right to re-marry.
>
> The Orthodox Church always allowed it, and Theodore Archbishop of Canterbury at the end of the seventh century allowed it.
>
> The new canons sought to establish a law for the Church which was above the law of the land.
>
> If they were passed anyone granted a divorce decree by the law courts who married again would be automatically excommunicated and their children would be illegitimate.
>
> These proposals had no prospect of being approved by Parliament.
>
> Was this the moment for the Church of England to embark on a course the result of which would be Disestablishment?
>
> It would mean that this would be the last Coronation by the Archbishop of Canterbury, and that there would be a large measure of disendowment just when the Church was appealing for funds to maintain its clergy and preserve its parish churches.

We append another outspoken declaration by a parish priest, the Rev. H. G. Green, Vicar of St. Nicholas Church, Ipswich. The repot is taken from the *Daily Mail*, November 17th.

> The Rev. Harold G. Green, 69 year-old vicar of St. Nicholas Church, Ipswich, told his crowded congregation last night that the official Church of England attitude towards the marriage in church of 'innocent' divorcees was 'neither Christian, logical, nor common sense.'
>
> Last week Mr. Green was criticized by the Archdeacon of Suffolk, the Ven C. O. George, for failing to observe the request of the bishops to clergy to decline to give a church re-marriage to divorcees.
>
> He was named as one of two clergymen in the diocese of St. Edmundbury and Ipswich who married divorcees.
>
> The vicar said last night: 'I have officiated at the remarriage of quite a few divorcees, and I thank God from this pulpit that I did so. They have lived to shame some of those people who condemned them.'
>
> The case of each divorcee who applied to remarry in church had to be considered 'carefully and prayerfully,' and he warned against making hasty judgments.

'If you and I were to be judged on the Last Day by human beings then God help the lot of us,' the vicar said.

'Many people have already left the Church, and many more are about to do so because of this harsh, cruel, and harmful attitude.

'I have been told that innocent parties who have figured in divorce actions have been afraid to attend Holy Communion service in case they should be refused the Holy Sacrament. What a wicked thing.'

Mr. Green's declaration prompts the question: What right has Mr. Green to disobey his Bishop? The answer is that the Vicar promised to obey his Bishop 'in all things lawful.' If what a bishop orders is not lawful then the vicar is justified in refusing to obey it: he has no right to break the law because the bishop requests him to do so.

Divorce and Church Discipline

Behind all the controversy in church circles about divorce and discipline one fundamental question presents itself. Has Church discipline the authority of Jesus Christ?

According to the Gospel of Jesus the sinner's desire for forgiveness is anticipated by God's forgiveness. That is the profound teaching of the Parable of the Prodigal Son. For Jesus there is no irreparable past such as is emphasized by the poet Agathon, cited with approbation by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*: 'The gods themselves cannot make that which has been done as though it had not been done' (vi, 2, 6).

In the Gospel of Jesus the sinful past can not only be forgiven, but can be made the means of attaining a moral and spiritual condition higher than that which could have been achieved had there been no precedent sin.

'I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance' (*Lk.* xv; 7).

This is the Gospel of the Grace of God which transcends the Aristotelian ethic. St. Paul sums up this doctrine of Divine Grace in a startling antithesis: 'Where Sin abounded; Grace did much more abound' (*Rom.* v, 20). This is the Spirit of the Gospel of the New Life and this ought to be the Spirit of the Christian Church in its attitude towards the problems of divorce and re-marriage. It is emphasized in those unforgettabe Sayings of Jesus:

'He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her' (*John* viii; 7).

'Her sins which are many are forgiven; for she loved much' (*Lk.* vi; 37).

'Forgive and ye shall be forgiven' (*Lk.* vi; 37).

'Him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.' (*John* vi; 37).

Does not New Testament criticism justify the conclusion that Church discipline is derived from the Jewish Synagogue in which sinners were publicly beaten for their sins and that it had no place in the Gospel preached by Jesus Christ?

In the Gospel of Jesus, as St. Paul recognized, three virtues are supreme—Faith, Hope, Love—and the sinner, seeking forgiveness, is seen as one needing compassion and assistance, not as one deserving discipline.

The Christian Church exists not to inflict discipline but by prayer, example and teaching to extend divine forgiveness and fellowship.

Samuel Johnson described a second marriage as the triumph of hope over experience. How true must this be in the case where the first marriage has broken down. And the Christian Church ought to do all in its power, where this hope exists, to strengthen and direct it.

Nullity *versus* Divorce

If the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce could secure the substitution of the term Nullity for Divorce in connection with all proceedings for the dissolution of marriage it would achieve something of real value for the elimination of our State and Church entanglements in the Marriage and Divorce sphere.

The term Divorce is open to objection because of its double significance. In some cases it stands for liberation *a vinculo matrimonii* and in other cases for separation *a mensa et thoro*. The term 'divorcee' is also open to objection on the ground of ambiguity: it may mean either 'the guilty party' or 'the innocent party' in a divorce suit and so if applied in the latter case inflicts an undeserved stigma.

By retaining the term Divorce the Church of England renders itself in 'Catholic circles' open to the charge that its marriage ideals and practice are lower than those of the Church of Rome which does not authorize Divorce but only sanctions Nullity. Anyone acquainted with the case-law of Nullity as practised by the Roman Curia will arrive at the conclusion that it is not the morality of the Roman Church which is manifest in this sphere but the extraordinary ingenuity of its casuistry.

Already English Law makes use of the concept of Nullity in a restricted degree for the dissolution of Marriages. Why not extend the term Nullity to cover all cases terminating in the dissolution of a Marriage? This change in terminology would then lead to a practical comparison of the grounds of Nullity allowed by the two Churches, and we believe that this would

reflect what is surely the case that the English practice is at least as rational, moral and spiritual as that of the Church of Rome.

We have no doubt that it will be objected by traditionalist legalists that long English usage makes the substitution of Nullity for Divorce in all cases most undesirable and that in any case a change in terminology even when united to strictest definition is a form of sophistry which can effect nothing valuable: 'That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.'

We hold on the other hand, in view of the conflicts and misunderstandings which our present terminology for the dissolution of Marriages involves, that elimination of the term Divorce and the substitution of Nullity for it, promises great advantages. There are occasions when seeing things as they are demands that we should also see things as our opponents see them and utilize both points of view to achieve a higher synthesis.

SIMONE WEIL

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick

IN the year 1872, after a calamitous war, Ernest Renan published his *La Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale*, to rebuke, exhort and comfort his defeated and dispirited countrymen. In 1918, after a war crowned by victory purchased at terrible cost, a call to moral and intellectual reform might have seemed out of place, so none was forthcoming, unless we include Loisy's *La Religion* (1917). Far more typical of the post-war mood of disillusionment was Barbusse's *Le Feu*. The French nation licked its wounds and was in no mood for sermons. Then in 1940 came disaster. No distinguished savant was now at hand to point the way to salvation, but a young girl of whom few had heard wrote a book in England at the instigation of other exiles, entitled *L'Enracinement*.[1] She died a few months after writing her book, in August, 1943, at the age of 34. This was her only systematic work, though she had jotted down her thoughts in notebooks and a selection of these was published after her death under the title *La Pesanteur et la Grâce*.[2] She had also written letters and essays, the most important of the former addressed to a Dominican priest, a Father Perrin, published with the title *Attente de Dieu*,[3] giving reasons why she could not accept baptism into the Roman Catholic Church. All these works were posthumously published.

As introduction to her ideas and beliefs some outline of the life of this remarkable woman is called for. She was born in Paris in 1909 of parents Jewish by race but not by religion, for they were of the freethinking intelligentsia. As a child she would seem to have been more than ordinarily sensitive to the sufferings of others; for when she was five, in 1914, the sight of wounded soldiers caused her to refuse to take sugar, as it was needed for the men at the front. Her education was the usual one of her class —the intelligent and well-off *bourgeoisie*. At the *lycée* she came under the influence of the philosopher Alain; was three years (1928-31) at the *Ecole Normale*, out of which she passed with distinction as a qualified teacher of philosophy, and took up teaching at a girls' school at Le Puy. She has been described during this early period of her life as 'shy, precociously intelligent — and

[1] E. T. (1952) *The Need for Roots*. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 18/-.
[2] E. T. (1952) *Gravity and Grace*. Same publisher. 15/-.
[3] E. T. (1951) *Waiting on God*. Same publisher. 12/6.

lonely,' also as 'unprepossessing in appearance, and ironically indifferent towards her official superiors in authority generally.'[4] Perhaps rather a difficult young woman. Between 1931 and 1933 she taught at three different schools — at Auxerre and Roanne as well as Le Puy, which suggests that she did not fit in too easily with the prejudices and conventions of her calling.

As is generally the case with generous-hearted and rebellious youth, Simone's sympathies at this period were with the political Left. When the unemployed at Le Puy had to break stones for road metal to qualify for relief, this provocative young woman not only took part in a demonstration of protest, but joined the workmen in their stone-breaking — a job fit only for navvies — and lived on their rations. She contributed at the same time to a journal whose title, *Révolution Prolétarienne*, sufficiently indicated its sympathies.

The stone-breaking episode demonstrated that Simone Weil was, unlike certain of our young Left-wing intellectuals, no mere dilettante or parlour Socialist. And in 1934, perhaps to the relief of her colleagues, this intractable young woman must go off to Paris to engage herself as a worker in the Renault factory, 'on the principle apparently that socialist intellectuals ought to know what they are talking about.'[5]

Simone Weil, however, was not cut out for this sort of employment, as she found to her cost, either physically or psychologically. She was subject to violent headaches, her too active intelligence found the mechanical job of machine-minding unendurable, and her sensitive make-up was revolted by the whole soulless, noisy and mechanical routine of a factory, so inhuman and deadening. In less than a year she had a breakdown and had to give it up. The experience left an indelible mark upon her. She had become acquainted with what she called *malheur*, a word, and an idea, which figured prominently in her writings afterwards.

> 'After my year in the factory,' she wrote some years later to her friend Father Perrin, 'I was, as it were, in pieces, soul and body. That contact with affliction had killed my youth. . . . There I received for ever the mark of a slave, like the branding of the red-hot iron which the Romans put on the foreheads of their most despised slaves. Since then I have always regarded myself as a slave.'

In one of her letters she relates another experience which deeply affected her. Not so long after the Renault adventure, she

[4] From an article by G. L. Arnold in the *Cambridge Journal* for March, 1951.

[5] G. L. Arnold *loc. cit.*

went with her parents, 'in a wretched condition physically,' on a holiday in Portugal. Here she entered, alone, a little fishing village on the day of its patronal festival. It was an evening of full moon, and the fishermen's wives were going in procession round the boats, carrying candles and singing hymns which seemed to her 'of a heart-rending sadness.' And suddenly the conviction was borne in upon her that 'Christianity is pre-eminently the religion of slaves; that slaves cannot help belonging to it, and I among them.'

Such, if it may so be termed, was her conversion from the agnosticism in which she had been reared, to Christianity. She had arrived at Nietzsche's estimate of that religion; but what repelled him, attracted her. It will be noted that the conversion was emotional rather than intellectual, and in part the result of extreme physical exhaustion and depression.

Like many idealist Left-wing sympathizers, Simone Weil felt impelled to make, in 1936, the pilgrimage to Spain and to cast in her lot with the Republican forces there; but this generous if ill-advised enterprise was no more successful than the Renault adventure. She spilt some boiling oil over her feet and so put an end to her campaigning. Psychologists, no doubt, would readily supply an explanation of this incident. But her sojourn among the Reds had one result; she had seen enough to disillusion her with their ways. Salvation did not lie there.

But her spiritual pilgrimage continued, and in 1937 she spent two days at Assisi.

> 'There, alone in the little XIIth century Romanesque chapel of Santa Maria degli Angeli, an incomparable marvel of purity where St. Francis often used to pray, something stronger than I was compelled me for the first time in my life to go down on my knees.'

The following year she spent Passion Week and Easter at Solesmes, following all the liturgical services, while suffering at the same time from cruel headaches, so that each sound 'hurt like a blow.' Yet

> 'by an extreme effort of concentration I was able to rise above this wretched flesh, to leave it to suffer by itself, and to find a pure and perfect joy in the unimaginable beauty of the chanting and the words. This experience enabled me to get a better understanding of the possibility of loving divine love in the midst of affliction. It goes without saying that in the course of these services the thought of the Passion of Christ entered into my being, once and for all.'

On this occasion she made the acquaintance of a young English Catholic who introduced her to the works of the English metaphysical poets of the seventeenth century. She was fascinated

especially by one of George Herbert's poems, entitled *Love*, and opening with the lines:

> 'Love bade me welcome: yet my soul drew back,
> Guiltie of dust and sinne.'

She learned it by heart, and would often say it over and over at the culminating point of a violent headache, concentrating all her attention upon it, and 'clinging with all my soul to the tenderness it enshrines.' Without her realizing it, she says, the recitation of the poem had for her the virtue of a prayer. And 'it was during one of these recitations that Christ himself came down and took possession of me.'

This experience, of which, no doubt, various explanations could be offered, was, for Simone Weil, a turning point; because it was something new which had to be fitted into her scheme of things. The problem of God had always seemed to her insoluble; but she had never hitherto entertained the possibility 'of a real contact, person to person, here below, between a human being and God.'

> 'I had vaguely heard tell of things of this kind, but I had never believed in them.'

It was not as if she had been steeping herself in mystical literature, and expecting something of the sort to happen. For she had never read any works of the kind, 'because I had never felt any call to read them.' Nor had she been in the habit of praying, being afraid of the power of suggestion that may lie in prayer. In fact she says that never until the summer of 1941 had she ever prayed. At this time she learned by heart the Lord's Prayer in the Greek, and such was its attraction for her that for several days she could not stop herself saying it over all the time. She then made a practice of saying it through once each morning with absolute attention.

> 'At times the very first words tear my thoughts from my body and transport it to a place outside space . . . Sometimes, also, during this recitation or at other moments. Christ is present with me in person, but his presence is infinitely more real, more moving, more clear than on that first occasion when he took possession of me.'

The above account of Simone Weil's spiritual Odyssey is derived from letters written by her to her friend Father Perrin, the Dominican whom she met in Marseilles in 1941, the Weil family having left Paris after the German occupation. Perrin introduced her by letter to Gustav Thibon (a farmer and a self-taught man of letters) as a young Jewish girl, a graduate in philosophy and a militant supporter of the extreme Left, who was anxious to work for a while as a farm hand. Thibon, who had had some experience of young intellectuals who desire to work on the land, felt some

natural reluctance to accept the offer, but quieted his qualms out of charity and agreed to do so. The result may be described in his own words :

> 'A few days later Simone Weil arrived at my house. At first our relationship was friendly but uncomfortable. On the concrete plane we disagreed on practically everything. She went on arguing *ad infinitum* in an inexorably monotonous voice, and I emerged from these endless discussions literally worn out. I enveloped myself in an armour of patience and courtesy in order to bear with her.'

It appeared that with alarming spontaneity this young lady displayed all that was least pleasing in her nature, but she gained immeasurably in an atmosphere of intimacy, and turned out to be a charming and lively companion. So much so, indeed, that there appears to be some ground for believing that Thibon made her an offer of marriage. Though in poor health, she insisted that his house was too comfortable, and went to live in an old half-ruined farm, worked without sparing herself on the land, and while doing hard physical work sent half her ration coupons to the political prisoners. Blackberries from the hedges sometimes served her for a meal. In the evenings she read Plato with Thibon, whose knowledge of Greek was more or less elementary. He found her an inspiring teacher. Then, leaving him, she returned to Marseilles to join her parents, who were preparing to leave the country for U.S.A. She decided (May, 1942) to accompany them, but in November of the same year she re-crossed the Atlantic and settled in London, where she worked with the Gaullists, desiring to be parachuted into France; but her racial type being too conspicuous, it was not thought advisable — the Gestapo would have got her right away.

It was considered that the most useful task she could perform would be to provide and inject some spiritual stimulant into her demoralized countrymen; to diagnose their spiritual illness and to prescribe some cure. This choice of a physician was well made, and the book *L'Enracinement* (E.T. *The Need for Roots*) was the result. This work, as hastily written as Newman's masterpiece, is a diagnosis not only of the French *malaise*, but has a wider reference; the causes of modern man's maladjustment are examined. The trouble is "uprootedness.'

> 'To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul. It is one of the hardest to define. A human being has roots by virtue of his real, active and natural participation in the life of a community which preserves in living shape certain particular treasures of the past and certain particular expectations for the future. Every human being needs to have multiple roots. It is necessary for him to draw wellnigh the whole of his moral, intellectual and spiritual life by way of the environment of which he forms a natural part.'

For Simone Weil, contemporary Frenchmen, whether proletarians of the towns or peasants of the country, were uprooted; or any roots they might have were in barren soil. The culture that prevails is directed towards and influenced by technical science. This modern culture, developed in a restricted medium, is divested of any intrinsic merit it may contain by the process known as popularization, and the residue is shovelled into the minds of the public. The desire to learn for the sake of learning, the desire for truth, has become very rare. The object of scientific study is not knowledge but power; still less is it wisdom. We study nature not from love of nature but to get power over it.

According to our science, indeed, force rules supreme over all natural phenomena, and it is therefore incompatible with anything of a religious spirit. Our science finds material expression in the scientific technology which has created the artificial world which our proletariat inhabits, a world in which religion is out of place. The scientific mythology rules it out. Moreover, for our people the non-technological past is simply blotted out by the imposing achievements of technology; thus modern populations have no sense of the past; they have thrown it all away, 'like a child plucking the petals off a rose.' For them, as for Henry Ford, 'history is bunk'—and religion too. Hence the 'uprootedness' of modern populations in both town and country, for the mentality of the town has captured the country too. The countryman feels an inferiority complex in the face of his town brother and must imitate his ways. The lad on the tractor thinks the same thoughts as his comrade at the factory bench.

Uprootedness is endemic now among the white races; everywhere they are destroying the past, 'stupidly, blindly, both at home and abroad,' and the past, once destroyed, never returns. And the destruction of the past 'is perhaps the greatest of all crimes.' Needless to say, Simone Weil did not identify love of the past with reaction, for even revolution draws its inspiration from the past. Tradition, if it has not become a dust-bowl, is the soil out of which all things grow. Any people who suffer from this malady of uprootedness either 'fall into a lethargy resembling death,' like the French of 1940, or hurl themselves into some form of destructive activity, like Hitler's Germans.

Disillusioned Marxists have been known to fly to what looks like the opposite extreme and have sought refuge in the Roman Catholic Church. Simone Weil was no Marxist, though she thought that Marx had some relevant things to say, but she had, as we have seen, Left-wing sympathies. But her somewhat sudden appreciation of the genuineness of Christian religious experience,

and of the depth of the Christian point of view contrasted with the shallowness and poverty of much contemporary thinking, did not produce in her any wish to enter the Church. Her friend Father Perrin was willing and anxious to give her baptism, and she gives him her reasons for declining in letters printed in *Waiting on God*. Whether an attempt will be made to claim her for the Church remains to be seen. A sympathetic article in the Dominican journal *Blackfriars* for August, 1950, entitled 'Simone Weil, God's Servant,' may be an indication that something of the kind may be contemplated. At any rate, in her case the words *anathema sit* have not been pronounced. But perhaps the influence of the Dominicans at Rome is less strong than that of the Society of Jesus, and the Jesuits may regard Simone Weil with less sympathy, and recommend caution. The writer of this article was somewhat surprised to find that of four secular priests serving a Roman Catholic church in a provincial town not one had heard of Simone Weil. But perhaps it was not really surprising. A number of Anglican clergy, he found, had not heard of her either.

Among the reasons given by Simone Weil to her friend to account for her reluctance to cross the Church's threshold was her distrust of what she called 'Church patriotism,' which she regarded as an inevitable result of the Church being 'a social structure' demanding, or at any rate causing, the individual's surrender to the collective. Having, as she said, strong gregarious tendencies herself, and thus susceptible to herd influence, she felt that her intellectual integrity depended on her remaining unattached. She believed also that the Roman Church fell short of true catholicity through its failure to be sufficiently inclusive. So many things of importance and value lay outside it.

> 'All the immense stretches of past centuries; all the countries inhabited by coloured races; all secular life in the white peoples' countries; all the traditions banned as heretical—the Manichaeans and Albigenses, for instance.'

She desired what she called 'a truly incarnated Christianity,' a Church which had wholly repudiated all use of the two sinister words *Anathema sit*. She could not identify herself with any Church that used them.

> 'I remain (outside) with all those things which cannot enter the Church on account of those two little words. I remain beside them all the more because my own intelligence is numbered among them.'

Perhaps Simone Weil's reluctance to take a step which would associate herself indissolubly with the Roman Church was due chiefly to the circumstance that it was Roman — 'the ghost of the Roman Empire seated upon the throne of the Caesars.' For she

loathed the Romans as much as she loathed the pre-exilic Hebrews. For her the Romans were materialists, tyrants and vulgarians, enslaving others and defiling everything they touched. She did not speak out of ignorance, for she was a good classical scholar, loving the Greeks, their literature and their ideas, as much as she disliked the Romans, who blew their own trumpet too loud.[6]

The Romans were conquerors, and it is the conquerors who write for posterity. Oblivion covers the conquered. There is evidence that the Gauls, conquered by Julius Caesar, were in some respects highly civilized, but most of the evidence has been destroyed. For the Romans slavery was the basic institution of society, and their conception of God as a master of slaves (for this is what the deified Emperor was) was analogous to it. This Roman conception of God still persists in orthodox quarters. Simone Weil quotes the Catholic philosopher and apologist Maritain:

> 'The notion of right is even deeper than that of moral obligation, for God has a sovereign right over his creatures and he has no moral obligation towards them (though he owes it to himself to give them what is required by their nature).

Here we have the slave-owner conception. A sovereign right is the right of property according to the Roman idea, or any other idea similar to it. The total abolition of this Roman notion of God is essential if the mystical tradition is to prevail. For the mystic's love is not the servile devotion of slave to a master, but something freely given — 'the love which drives a free man to bring himself body and soul into servitude to what constitutes perfect good.' But the influence of the mystics was powerless to destroy in the Church this heritage of Roman irreligion, because the Church had the same need of it as had the Empire, for temporal dominion. Ecclesiastical imperialism carried the day.

> 'A Christian civilization in which the light of Christianity would have illuminated the whole of life, would only have been possible if the Roman conception of enslaving people's minds adopted by the Church had been cast aside. The relentless and victorious struggle waged by St. Bernard against Abelard shows how very far this was from happening. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, this civilization still in process of formation, was destroyed by the ruin of its principal centre (the lands south of the Loire), the setting up of the Inquisition, and the stifling of religious thought in the interests of orthodoxy.'

[6] Cf. C. N. Cochrane, *Christianity and Classical Culture*, p. 98: 'With Livy we are far removed from the Thucydidean sense of history as a diligent and meticulous search for truth, conducted with due regard for the most exacting standards of evidence (Thuc. i. 22). What Livy offers is rather an unabashed tract for the times; the Augustan version, in fact, of Plato's noble lie.'

It has been said that the levity of the Olympian gods shipwrecked on the needs of the human heart. The same, perhaps, might be said of the nineteenth-century religion of progress. It was Feuerbach who said that the Christian doctrine that God (incarnate in Christ) suffers, means in reality that suffering for others is divine. Simone Weil seems to have felt that there was not only something cathartic in suffering (*malheur*), but something revelatory about it — that it bestowed a certain kind of insight. This was why Christianity is the religion of slaves, and why all slaves belong to it. Perhaps a man has to undergo *malheur* before he can ask the questions to which Christianity is a reply. St. Augustine remarked that the saying of Jesus, 'Come unto me,' etc., is not to be found in the classical literature. Simone Weil describes what she means by the word *malheur*: it is something far more penetrating and desolating than mere physical distress or pain — her cruel headaches, for instance. It was a feeling of isolation, despair, degradation even, which expresses itself in the cry 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?' Christ experienced *malheur*, and for this reason Simone Weil would rather have hung by his side, like the penitent thief, than to have been at his right hand in his glory — as she told Father Perrin. There may have been present in her make-up something of what the psychologists term masochism, and she does appear to have deliberately sought suffering (else why break stones, live on meagre rations, give up sugar as a child, work in a factory, or the land at back-breaking jobs on a diet of blackberries?) But it is clear she was not seeking it for its own sake, but in order to identify herself with the sufferings of others. She felt impelled to bear those sufferings, not in imagination, but in reality. A singular *penchant*, certainly; but a man's character is his fate, and she had to act that way; it was 'laid upon her.' One or two of her remarks about affliction perhaps shed some light on her feelings in this matter:

> 'Suffering: superiority of man over God. The Incarnation was necessary so that this superiority should not be scandalous.'
>
> 'We should seek neither to escape suffering, nor to suffer less; but to remain untainted by suffering.'
>
> 'The extreme greatness of Christianity lies in the fact that it does not seek a supernatural remedy for suffering, but a supernatural use for it.'

Simone Weil began her career as a teacher. Had there been no war, it is likely that she would have continued in that profession and have made contributions of value to educational theory and practice. An essay comprising only nine pages of print in the English translation of *Attente de Dieu*, and entitled 'Reflections

on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love o God,' is important. She here expresses the view that the key to Christian conception of studies is bound up with a particular vie of *attention*. Though people seem to be unaware of it, she says,

> 'The development of the faculty of attention forms the real object an almost the sole interest of studies.'

A student may have no aptitude for geometry, but this does no mean that his faculty of attention will not be developed b wrestling with a problem. It does not even matter much whethe he succeeds in finding the solution, though it is important h should try his hardest to do so; for never is a genuine effort o attention wasted. He has been making progress; for without h knowing it his apparently barren effort has already borne fruit.

> 'Every time that a human being succeeds in making an effort attention with the sole idea of increasing his grasp of truth, he acquire a greater aptitude for grasping it, even if his effort produces no visib fruit.'

She points out, furthermore, that attention should not be con fused with a kind of muscular effort, to expend which result only in fatigue. Attention consists rather in suspending though leaving it detached, empty and ready to be penetrated by th object; not seeking anything, but waiting and ready to receiv what will come to it. 'We do not obtain the most precious gift by going in search of them but by waiting for them.' One is heale by 'looking,' as were the Israelites in the desert by looking at th serpent.

The connection between this view of attention and Simo Weil's theory of religious enlightenment lies in her statement tha 'absolutely unmixed attention *is* prayer.' If we turn our whol minds towards the good, it is impossible that little by little th whole soul will not be attracted thereto in spite of itself.

> 'Extreme attention is what constitutes the creative faculty in ma and the only extreme attention is religious. The amount of creative geni in any period is strictly in proportion to the amount of extreme attentio and thus of authentic religion at that period.'

Thus to train the young in attention can be a first step t training them in religion, which should be the ultimate object o all education. Studies thus practised should lead to an aptitud for religion.

> 'Prayer being only attention in its pure form, and studies being form of gymnastics for the attention, each school exercise should be refraction of spiritual life. There must be method in it. A certain way doing a Latin prose, a certain way of tackling a problem in geome (and not just any way) make up a system of gymnastics of the attentio calculated to give it a greater aptitude for prayer.'

Those who look for a systematic metaphysic or a systematic theology in Simone Weil's writings will be disappointed; but perhaps such a lack does not much matter in her case, and at any rate in a life like hers, too short and too full of experiment, there simply was not time. Had she lived to be as old at Immanuel Kant, perhaps; but those whom the gods love die young. Theology after all, as has been said, is only indulged in by the religious in their irreligious moments, and of these Simone Weil had too few. As for philosophy, the student of her writings will find many sayings of deep and suggestive philosophic import, such as her view, for instance, that the uniformity of nature should be looked upon as obedience. And her remark that we know by means of our intelligence that what the intelligence does not comprehend is more real than what it does comprehend, cuts her off from the dogmatic philosophers. While from the dogmatic theologians she is cut off by a saying like:

> 'The mysteries of faith are degraded if they are made into an object of affirmation and negation, when in reality they should be an object of contemplation.'

What are we to make of this singular young woman, emerging like a rocket from the darkness of her country's distress, shedding against the night sky a brilliant shower of fiery particles, and then to be seen no more? It is not easy to place her. She cannot be claimed either by the Kremlin or the Vatican, those rival seats of totalitarian authority. Yet she was no mere liberal humanist, an evangelist of secular progress. Nor yet is she the too familiar type of reactionary anti-humanist; Barth is not her master, and she looks back neither to Calvin nor to Aquinas (she dislikes the latter's dependence upon Aristotle). She is alive to the weakness and misery of man, but she does not harp on original sin, and does not much care for Pascal. Some might even regard her as a Pelagian, for she can see the point of view of the outsider, the atheist, the unchurched or those who have never entered a church. The publicans and sinners were her mates. She was not even an internationalist, for primarily she was a patriot, believing in national traditions, for tradition was everything for her. Though her patriotism would hardly please everybody, she regarded imperialism as spiritual murder, and had no use for the chosen race mythology. Also, she could say that France was the aggressor in 1870, and that the *débâcle* of 1940 was deserved. She had no use whatever for the realist politics of Richelieu or the Chauvinism of Maurras. It is strange to reflect, she remarks, that in the Gospels the Pharisees appear as the patriotic party, whereas the publicans were the collaborationists.

That she was a genuine Christian mystic there can be no doubt whatever, and it is perhaps here that her true significance for our time lies. She may stand for a new approach to religion. Not altogether new, perhaps, for historical precedents suggest that mysticism flourishes in periods of general unsettlement and ecclesiastical decline. In the fourteenth century in England men's minds were unsettled, as ours are to-day, by wars and social changes, not to mention calamities like the Black Death. Great calamities often encourage fatalist views and harsh Augustinian doctrines about God and man; hence phenomena like Barth's Neo-Calvinism. To this fourteenth century belong mystics like Dame Juliana of Norwich, Richard Rolle, Walter Hilton, and the anonymous author of 'The Cloud of Unknowing.' These mystics made little reference to the ceremonies and sacraments of the Church — even to the Mass. They were concerned, rather, with individual spiritual culture. Their emphasis upon personal religion, and upon the possibility of an immediate approach to God, apart from sacrament or priest, tended to undermine belief in a sacerdotal and sacramental religion. This was one source of the Lollard movement.[7]

It may often have been the case that mystics have isolated themselves from a troublesome world. Dr. Inge has remarked that Plotinus 'ignored the chaos which surrounded his peaceful lecture-room,' and 'to read him, one would never suspect that he was a contemporary of Valerian and Gallienus.'[8] It is quite obvious that Simone Weil was not of the number of those who act in this manner. On the contrary, she immersed herself in the turmoil and suffering of her time, sacrificing health, and in the end life, that she might share in it. Can it be that she is a new type of saint? She did not claim to be one herself, but declared that a new type of saint was needed. Perhaps she pointed the way?

[7] See Professor A. R. Myers' *England in the Late Middle Ages* (1952), p. 70.
[8] Cochrane. *Op. cit.*, p. 172.

RELIGION IN THE LIGHT OF MENTAL ADAPTATION

By G. M. N. Tyrrell, Sometime President of the Society of Psychical Research

THE object of this article is to show clearly our situation in this world and the perspective it throws on religion. Surely, it will be said, our situation is clear: science has revealed it: philosophy has delved deeply into it: we know what we are and the nature of our surroundings. But it is here contended that nature has drawn a subtle and invisible veil across our situation. We unconsciously accept certain things before we begin to think and these permeate our after-thoughts. The central cause of this is adaptation.

We are not only minutely adapted to our planet: we are adapted to the entire physical world of matter, space and time: and we are adapted *mentally* as well as physically. This mental adaptation has tremendous consequences; but only very slowly can we realize them.

Dr. Julian Huxley gave a very interesting series of talks on Evolution on the B.B.C. in October and November, 1951. These talks are more apposite from the present point of view than technical books, for they give a bird's-eye-view of the whole. The essential feature of the talks for our present subject is the development of man's mind and the growth of his intellect. Dr. Huxley lays stress on the improvement or higher development of the human mind: but surely the crucial point is its *adaptation* to its surroundings. Was the human mind adapted?

> 'Pure biological progress,' he says, 'in fact has come to an end, but human progress is just beginning. There is a radical difference between them, which is correlated with an equally radical difference between any kind of animal life and any kind of human life. This means that the human intellect is completely severed from the minds of animals.'

But does this iron curtain exist? Some animals have the rudiments of intelligence — monkeys and elephants, for example, and also dogs. And when man was beginning to emerge from the animal world thousands of years ago he was mainly under the influence of instinct, as were all animals. And *instinct* is the factor that adapts all life to its environment. As man slowly developed, his instinctive faculties must have been carried with him. When did they disappear?. When, later, language enabled men to pool their ideas, did instinctive adaptation of the mind disappear? Dr.

Huxley detaches the quality of the human intellect from all that has gone before. It is an evolutionary product, he maintains, but the previous factors in the mind do not interpenetrate it. There is no continuity in quality between the intellect and the pre-intellectual development of the mind. It is like water; when boiled it suddenly turns into steam.

It is true that the human intellect contrasts vastly with the mind of early man: but beneath the surface it is linked with it. A very important point is that the human mind has been adapted to see things from a pragmatic standpoint.

Let us look at our situation in the world, in which adaptation to our surroundings plays the leading rôle. Nothing is simple in our world: everything is extremely complex and subtle; and the more deeply we look into any of our surroundings the more incomprehensible they become. Pure science shows this. E. Schrödinger says that the particles of matter have no sameness. It is beyond doubt, he says, that the question of sameness, of identity, really and truly has no meaning. And this drives causality off into the blue. And he says that physical objects have form only; their substance is always changing.

> 'As our mental eye penetrates into smaller and smaller distances and shorter and shorter times, we find nature behaving so entirely differently from what we observe in visible and palpable bodies of our surroundings that *no* model shape after our large-scale experiences can ever be "true"' (*Science and Humanism*).

This shows that investigation carries truth beyond the compass of our mind.

On the other hand, the world is so simple to the practical mind that an infant or an untutored savage can understand it perfectly. What an incredible antithesis! To the unthinking mind all is simple and perfectly comprehensible; and, in addition, everything appears to be ultimate and *final*. To the thinking mind, on the other hand, all goes off into the blue. So, whatever we investigate in our world is simple and comprehensible at the start; but it becomes more and more complex and less and less comprehensible as the investigation proceeds. This is as plain and obvious as a sign-post; but it is hidden from us by nature's veil, and there is a good reason why it should be.

It will no doubt be stated that science discovers ultimate truths. Here again the truth is subtle and hard to grasp. Fifty years ago the aether and its waves were firmly believed in: they had been confirmed by observation and experiment. Now the question is whether light is composed of waves or particles. Eddington has said: "There are no pure waves and no pure

particles.' This seems to take the theory of light beyond our comprehension. But it will be said that there are fundamental and ultimate truths discovered by science. Eddington's cosmical numbers would be an example of something final. But we need not look deeply into science for ultimate truths: we are in touch with reality through our senses (though in a very specialized way). Do we not reach ultimate reality in everyday life? Is not the distance between London and Edinburgh a final and ultimate fact? It is supported by observation. But the philosophical analysis of sense-perception hangs many questions and difficulties in the way.

No one seems to realize that artificiality has been introduced by nature into everyday life. The universe is continuous: it goes beyond the range of our senses without a break. But our senses reveal only the area of reality necessary for practical life: there they end; but the world does not end there. Our mind is adapted in order to collaborate with the senses, and when it reaches the boundary of the sense-world it is reflected back into the sense-world by a subjective factor, which has adapted it for practical efficiency.

The nature of that part of the ordinary world with which we deal and the adaptation of our senses, body and mind are subtly interwoven. The size of our bodies is one factor for making our surroundings simple. Because of our size, our senses show us molar matter and not atoms and particles. This makes the world appear artificially simple.

We are in touch with the real world, not with a subjective world; but the way in which it is presented to us is extraordinarily subtle. Our senses and our bodies are in touch with reality; but illusions have been introduced during our evolution in order to make the world appear simple. These illusions have been introduced into our adapted minds, and the principal illusion is that the sense-world is made to appear final, ultimate and all-inclusive. The objects surrounding us are simple, whole, entire: they are all apparently there: they have no ragged edges — not a changing mass of shifting elements whose nature goes beyond us. This is what they really are; but it was essential that it should be hidden. Our size and our senses and the adaptation of our bodies and our minds fosters this illusion and makes the material world artificially simple both in appearance and in action.

Again, action in the material world reaches a final end. One may call all the problems which face common sense and applied science (which is 'organized common sense') convergent problems. No problem which arises in practical life leads to another and

another question. It does not go off into the blue. To take a simple course of action solves and finishes the problem.

This simplicity is dependent, among other things, on cause and effect. Causality is clear in practical life : if it were not, practical life would be impossible. In engineering cause and effect is the principle of any machine; but when pure physics investigates, the ultimate nature of matter is sought for; cause and effect fade out. In fact it does so whenever we cross the boundary of our adaptation to this world.

In this world we are in touch with reality (or with a portion of it); but this portion of reality has been made to appear artificially simple by the introduction of illusions. Illusions and reality are very subtly interwoven. The table in front of us is a plain object, perfectly simple and easy to understand. But the analysis of sense-perception drives all this simplicity away. The central thing in perception is *sensa*, or sense-data. Visual sense-data consist of a pattern of coloured patches. What are these sense-data? Are they on material objects? Is the *sensum* of the table-top on the table? Or, if we look at a penny, is the sense-datum which shows us the surface of the penny *on* the penny? Looking at the penny from an angle, the sense-datum is elliptical. Is this elliptical sense-datum on the penny? Surely not. Then where is it? Is it subjective? Again, we do not see this complicated mass of sense-data as just a continuous picture. We single out objects from the medley. We see a house, for example, and we realize it with a back and an inside which we do not see. Adapted instinct makes us do this. People who have been born blind and who have recovered their sight in later years are at first utterly bewildered by 'seeing.'

There is no space here to go into the analysis of sense-perception; but it shows how artificially the world of action was made simple. The senses are in touch with some portion of reality in a very subtle manner; but common sense assumes that naïve realism is true and holds on to it. This is one of the illusions which nature has inserted into our minds.

Thus we see that the combined adaptation to our surroundings of our bodies, our sense-organs and our minds have made the world simple for us and have concentrated our attention upon it. For illusion and reality to be interwoven in the most subtle sense was absolutely necessary.

All this proves that we are on an island : and this fact is hidden from us. We can, indeed, explore the island; it does not end in a clear-cut boundary : it gradually passes beyond our comprehension.

The characteristics of the adapted mind are these: (1) It is taken for granted that every problem that arises will converge to a final and entirely comprehensible solution. In the field of practical life, which includes that of applied science, this occurs. Nature has arranged it. If she had not, the necessary simplicity would not be there. (2) It is taken for granted that the senses reveal the entire universe in principle. This again is instilled into our minds for simplicity. If incomprehensible things were visible to the mind, self-confidence in action would be reduced. (3) It is taken for granted that the human intellect can grasp the entire universe in principle. This also is necessary for confidence in ordinary life. (4) It is taken for granted that the human mind views everything from a perfectly impartial standpoint. No one states these facts, for nature has drawn a veil over them. They are accepted unconsciously, for instinct at the lower levels of the mind has inserted them without our being aware of them. Nobody states them: but most people act on them. One example occurs in the lectures by Julian Huxley, quoted above:

> 'For a biologist, much the easiest way is to think of mind and matter as two aspects of a single underlying reality — shall we call it world substance, the stuff out of which the world is made?'

A 'substance' within the range of the sense-world and within the range of the intellect *must* be the ultimate origin of mind and matter. The origins of mind, life and matter itself go beyond our comprehension and beyond the limited range of our senses: but the adapted mind insists that they must all be within it. And this instinctive adaptation penetrates the intellect. Of course there are thousands of examples of this.

Thus mental adaptation forces upon us an entirely wrong perspective of reality. The focus is on what we perceive. Materialism is based on this. It is amusing that people who call themselves 'Rationalists' base their thought unconsciously on instinct and not on reason.

The effects of the adapted mind are not, however, simple. It operates mainly from the instinctive level of perception up to the level of common sense. We must realize that the human consciousness is *graded*. Adapted instinct operates at what I call the level of *Homo faber*: above this is *Homo sapiens*, the thinking man. We must think of the human being, not as a rounded off entity, but as an indefinite structure of gradations, something like the spectrum of light. The intellect is higher than the mental factors of perception: it is even higher than common sense: it can see the illusions which common sense accepts in order to make it efficient. These practical illusions do penetrate the intellect: but

they vary with different individuals. There is no space to go into these complexities here. Intuition is a higher level of the mind than logical reason. It is not merely a will-of-the-wisp. All the important ideas of progress are due to it. Genius is due to it. The leading authors, musicians and scientists have admitted that their thoughts came to them. Dr. Rosamund Harding's book, *An Anatomy of Inspiration*, quotes a wonderful number of admitted inspirations or intuitions. To quote one example. Wordsworth, when intuition came to him, found that the world around him seemed unreal. When inspiration would not come, 'William tired himself with hammering at a passage,' said Dorothy.

Above these intuitive thoughts is the level of mysticism. Mystical experience cannot be put into words because words were invented to cover common experience in this world. The self goes away beyond the portion of it which has been adapted to this world by nature. It is one with the whole.

Here some light is thrown by facts on an intermediary level. Telepathy and foreknowledge of the future have been carefully observed and tested. There is no reasonable doubt that they occur. Telepathy is not a form of 'brain-waves.' It is unity between selves beyond the body. Unity and separation can be combined: but this goes beyond our comprehension. Foreknowledge seems to annihilate free will: but this again goes beyond us. Telepathy and foreknowledge are beyond the limits that we have been fashioned to understand. They show that the world goes beyond our senses and our intellect: and they show that *we* go beyond them too. On the whole (though individuals vary) the adapted mind brushes these things aside because it has not been adapted to them.

To see religion in its right perspective we must first grasp our situation in this world. We must realize that we are on an island; that our minds are adapted; that we explore in one direction only, that which our senses open to us; that we ourselves have levels of gradation taking us beyond the sense-world; that the universe goes infinitely beyond our senses and our intellect. When we grasp this, we see that being — conscious being — is the centre of the universe, not matter, which common sense urges us to believe to be the centre of all things. This is the right perspective, which was realized in India many centuries ago. They climbed the mountain and left the intellect at the bottom. Grasping our present situation leads us to the realization that Religion is one and universal. The *Bhagavad Gita* says:

> 'The path of those who are attracted by Me as the Absolute and Unmanifest is much harder to travel than is that of those who worship

Me as God manifest, and having form. This Absolute conception is most difficult of realization to the finite mind of man. It is most difficult for the visible to realize the invisible — the finite, the infinite — the possessor of qualities and attributes, THAT which hath neither but yet is above both.'

Of course we cannot grasp this; but we can know the perspective of it. And, realizing this perspective, we know that all religions grasped by the masses are symbols of the Absolute which suit their minds. That is why we see idols and superstitions all over the world. But some, in all places and all ages, have risen above the adapted mind and experienced something of the incomprehensible glory beyond.

[1] 'like the hawk I went in I came forth like the Phoenix Star of the dawn. In the beautiful by the bright Lake of Hours: Risith the day.'
The Book of the Dead

'O happy and blessed one, thou hast put off thy mortality and shalt become divine.' *Orphic Tablet*

'Sorrows are passed and in the end is showed the treasure of immortality.'
Apocrypha

Of course hundreds of quotations could be cited from the mystics which show that vision far above the range of the intellect shows the universe in true perspective.

Christianity, like every other religion for the masses, has drawn universal religion into the mentality of this world. The Creed attempts to define God in the simplest language and regards this definition as final and ultimate — not symbolic; not beyond the compass of the ordinary mind. The Trinity is taken to be quite comprehensible and at the same time ultimate and absolute. Father and Son are human relations; and God is always spoken of as like a human being, with magnified powers. Only those who rise above the adapted mind realize that this mind cannot grasp everything. They know that what they experience cannot be put into words.

[1] *Seek Paradise,* by Constance Sitwell.

THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS*

By the Rev. H. F. D. Sparks, D.D., Oriel Professor of the Interpretation of Holy Scripture in the University of Oxford

THE discovery of the now famous Dead Sea Scrolls by Beduin in a cave near 'Ain Fashah in 1947 ranks as one of the most important landmarks in the whole history of Palestinian archaeology. So far as can be at the moment ascertained the finds comprise: (1) a complete text of the prophet Isaiah; (2) another, incomplete, text of Isaiah; (3) a commentary on the first two chapters of Habakkuk; (4) the so-called 'Sectarian Document' or 'Manual of Discipline,' setting forth a Rule of Life for members of a religious community; (5) a collection of psalms or hymns entitled 'Praises of the Lord'; (6) a work at present known as 'The War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness'; (7) an apocryphal Book of Lamech; and (8) some five or six hundred fragments, most of them very tiny, from both biblical and non-biblical books. The items numbered 2, 5 and 6 in the above list are the property of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and excerpts with specimen photographs have been published by Professor Sukenik: the items numbered 1, 3, 4 and 7 are the property of the neighbouring Syrian Convent of St. Mark, although they are for the time being in America, where full photographic facsimiles and transcriptions of 1, 3, and 4, have appeared already.

About the scrolls in general four things are clear: (1) they are the remains of an ancient library; (2) the library of which they formed a part was the library of a sect, as the nature of the non-biblical works abundantly testifies; (3) the sect to which the library belonged was either identical with, or closely related to, the sect that produced the 'Damascus Document' or 'Zadokite Fragment,' found in the Cairo *genizah* in 1896 and most readily accessible in English in the second volume of Charles's *Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha* — the occurrence of certain peculiar technical terms (*e.g.* the 'Teacher of Righteousness' in reference to the founder of the sect, the 'Sons of Zadok' in reference to its members, and the otherwise unknown word *serek* for their 'order') in both the documents found in the cave and in the document found

**The Hebrew Scrolls from the neighbourhood of Jericho and the Dead Sea* [*Friends of Dr. Williams's Library: Fourth Lecture,* 1950]. By G. R. Driver, M.A., F.B.A. (Oxford University Press, 1951: pp. 52: 3s. 6d. net).

The Dead Sea Scrolls: A preliminary Survey. By A. Dupont-Sommer: translated from the French by E. Margaret Rowley. (Basil Blackwell, 1952: pp. 100: 7s. 6d. net).

in the *genizah* places this beyond doubt; and (4) the scrolls were deposited in the cave for security in a time of crisis, since no community, however odd its theological ideas might be, would in normal circumstances keep its books in a remote cave which it is only possible to enter on hands and knees.

In addition, three further points should be borne in mind, especially when we are discussing dates. In the first place, in a library made up of so many separate scrolls as this was (it is estimated that at the time of the actual deposit the numbers must have run into hundreds) it is likely that there will have been considerable differences in date between individual scrolls, some being old, some almost new: when, therefore, we come across, or use, such a phase as 'the date of the scrolls' we must beware of assuming, albeit unconsciously, that all are of the same date. Secondly, the dates of the scrolls of the non-biblical works found in the cave are just as much separable from the dates of the composition of the works themselves as are the dates of the biblical scrolls from the dates of the biblical books of which they are copies — *i.e.* we have no more right to assume, for example, that the commentary on Habakkuk was composed only shortly before our manuscript of it was written than we have to assume that the Book of Isaiah was put together only shortly before either of the two Isaiah scrolls was written. And thirdly, the dates of the scrolls are similarly separable from the date of the deposit: some scrolls, as we have seen, may at the time have been several centuries old, so that we cannot of necessity argue from 'the date of the scrolls' to 'the date of the deposit' and *vice versa* — except, of course, inasmuch as the date of the latest scroll will provide the *terminus a quo* for the date of the deposit, and the date of the deposit the *terminus ad quem* for the date of the latest scroll. Stated thus baldly these three points may seem elementary; but they are liable to be overlooked, and, indeed, have not infrequently been overlooked, even in the discussions of the learned.

The scrolls have so far been discussed from every conceivable angle. And the two books under review well illustrate this variety of angle. Although neither of the authors explicitly says so, Professor Driver is obviously most interested in the biblical scrolls and the light they throw on the history of the text of the Old Testament, while Professor Dupont-Sommer is equally obviously most interested in the identity of the sect to which the scrolls belonged and the bearing of the conclusions reached in this field upon the history of Palestinian Judaism and the origins of Christianity.

Professor Driver starts his book with an account of the discovery of the scrolls and then passes to an account of their contents

so far as these contents are known. He has nothing to say about the identity of the sect to which they belonged apart from a passing reference to others' theories. He then settles down to questions of date. The so-called 'external evidence' for the date of the scrolls (*e.g.* the date of the jars in which they were stored) he finds inconclusive — 'new scrolls could have been put in old jars and old manuscripts could have been put in new jars' (p. 24). The 'internal evidence' he divides into two — palaeographical and orthographical. The palaeographical he regards as not merely inconclusive but 'useless' (p. 28), since (as so many fail, have failed, and persist in failing, to realise) there is no other roughly contemporary documentary material, of which the date is certainly known, available for comparison. Consequently, it is to the orthography and to the linguistic peculiarities of the copyists that he turns to find the key. The abundant use of *scriptio plena*, particular Aramaizing forms, the forms of certain pronominal suffixes, and much else, all point, he maintains, to a date 'somewhere between A.D. 200 and A.D. 500,' with an inclination 'towards the end rather than the beginning of this period' (pp. 47, 48). On the date of the deposit he will not commit himself — 'the fugitives who hid these scrolls in the cave near Jericho might be fleeing not from the persecution which Antiochus Epiphanes set in motion (165 B.C.) nor from the invasions of the Romans (63 B.C., A.D. 70 and 135) nor even from those of the Persians (A.D. 614) or of the Arabs (A.D. 637) but perhaps merely from some local tumult caused by racial or religious hatred of which history has preserved no record.' (p. 50).

By way of contrast Professor Dupont-Sommer is throughout ingenious, venturesome, and nothing if not definite in his conclusions. He too starts with an account of the discovery of the scrolls. He then treats — a little cursorily — the two Isaiah scrolls whose 'writing indicates approximately the first century B.C.; but from a purely palaeographical point of view there is nothing to exclude a slightly earlier or a slightly later dating, if other considerations point to it' (p. 19). Then the commentary on Habakkuk, the 'Sectarian Document,' the 'Zadokite Fragment,' the 'Praises of the Lord,' and 'The War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness,' are all passed in review one by one. In the process a great many historical references are pin-pointed exactly, and it transpires that the 'Teacher of Righteousness,' who founded the sect, exercised a ministry of some forty years, that he was martyred by Aristobulus II between 65 and 63 B.C., that in consequence the sect removed its headquarters to Damascus, that the commentary on Habakkuk was composed there about 41 B.C.,

that a return to Judaea was possible on the accession of Herod the Great in 37 B.C., and that the end came in the Jewish War of A.D. 66-70, when the Judaean communities of the sect were dispersed and the library of one of the communities was hidden in the cave at 'Ain Fashah before the flight. Subsequently, in two final chapters, Professor Dupont-Sommer identifies the sect with the Essenes, and concludes with a highly-coloured picture of Essenism as Christianity before Christ with the Teacher of Righteousness as the Central Figure.

Undoubtedly many will be at once attracted by this reconstruction — particularly as its plot is unfolded step by step with exceptional clarity and presented in a distinctly exciting, quasi-nursery, style. Thus:

> 'The fragment of the *Rule* [*i.e.* the 'Sectarian Document'] which we have quoted stops in the middle of a sentence . . . **How we should like to know what follows!**' (p. 52).

Yet this excerpt is very revealing in another direction. The only reason why the fragment in question 'stops in the middle of a sentence . . .' is that when Professor Dupont-Sommer was writing, the full text of the document had not been published and he was dependent on a specimen photograph which reproduced only ten lines of a single column! Indeed, as he himself confesses, he wrote his account of this document from the evidence of 'scarcely a fifth of the whole manuscript' (p. 45). Such an admission does not inspire confidence. It it all very well to describe one's book as 'a preliminary survey' and proclaim oneself 'ready to bow before new evidence' (p. 4); but to do so hardly entitles one to ignore what evidence there is (especially when it is of vital importance for one's fundamental theory) simply because it is temporarily inaccessible and the urge to rush into print is strong. Professor Dupont-Sommer's reconstruction may be right; but it is more probably wrong — and wrong not merely in detail. It is well to remember that in 1950 (the date of the French original of his book) *all* the non-biblical texts, apart from the commentary on Habakkuk, were still only available in a few specimen passages; and the position is not greatly altered now.

There is accordingly need for caution. We must await in patience the publication of complete texts of all the documents, and, moreover, the results of a great deal more hard textual and linguistic study of them, before any sure progress can be made in the direction Professor Dupont-Sommer would have us move. Meanwhile, in spite of the tempting bait he casts before us, the wise will prefer to emulate the sobriety of Professor Driver.

THE MEANING OF INCARNATION

By E. L. Allen, Ph.D., D.D., Head of the Department of Divinity, King's College, Newcastle upon Tyne

THAT Christianity is an incarnational religion is nowhere in dispute. It is accepted on both wings of the theological front, much as the sacramental principle is common ground to the Catholic and the Quaker. What is in dispute is the interpretation of the common conviction. Thus, to take the second instance first, one party affirms that to concentrate upon certain ritual actions is in fact the best means of pervading our whole experience with a sense of divine significance. The other would say that any such procedure inevitably restricts the divine and leads to a separation between the sacred and the secular. In the same way, the incarnation is understood by some as confined to the single instance of Jesus of Nazareth, while by others it is affirmed of human nature in general. Is Jesus an exception amid the human race, as being not only man but also God? Or is he the supreme instance of that presence of the divine in the human that may be predicated of us all? That is the question with which I propose to deal in this paper. I begin by analyzing the divergence in the hope of being able then to show how it may be transcended.

That the incarnation is individual rather than universal, exclusive rather than inclusive, was of course the import of the ancient creeds. The *homoousios* was applicable to one figure in history and to him alone. One of the most marked characteristics of contemporary neo-orthodoxy is a renewed insistence upon this. The incarnation is an event that took place once for all, that is wholly incomparable and may not be brought under the categories appropriate to other events. Thus Barth in his *Romans* makes the impact of God upon the world take the form of a tangent to a circle, touching it at a single point of such a nature that it is not accessible to our observation. In his *Dogmatik* the unique nature of the God-Man is presupposed throughout, it is indeed the foundation of a whole system that proclaims the identity of theology and Christology. Brunner lays similar stress on the uniqueness of the incarnation and is at great pains to show that this is *sui generis* and not to be confused with the kind of uniqueness that may be claimed for historical events. It constitutes a class by itself, so that to assimilate it to anything else would be to deny it.

On the other hand, there has always been a tendency to universalize the incarnation, so that what is affirmed in the creeds of

esus is extended in some sense to all mankind. In the religious hilosophy of Russian Orthodoxy as this developed in the last ntury, in Solovyev and Berdyaev, the God-Man becomes a mbol of the relation between God and man. They can speak of hrist as 'the revelation of the universal principle of God-anhood.' The peculiar form that Christology took in the East, th its bias towards a unity of the person even at the cost of the stinction between the natures, facilitated such a use of the gma. The mystics of all ages have sought for the divine as 'the ound of the soul' and 'the divine spark in every man,' while e Society of Friends took the further step of identifying 'that ich is of God in every man' with Christ. For Hegel the God-an is the symbol of the consubstantiality in the last resort of God d man. The human is but one moment in the self-development Absolute Spirit. The classical statement of the Unitarian sition, at least in Great Britain, is that of James Martineau. he incarnation is true, not of Christ exclusively, but of man iversally, and God everlastingly."[1]

In the passage from which this last quotation is taken, Martin-u shows clearly what his intention is. He proposes to apply to men what is said of one only in the creeds.

> 'Not till we say of all men what the creed says of him exclusively, that two natures go to make one person, both that which is born after its kind and that which is "of one substance with the Father"—the blended conditions of the *creature* and the *Son* of God—do we make any confession which he would own.'

ow it is precisely this attempt to appropriate and turn to another rpose the traditional language that I regard as singularly un-rtunate. In current terminology, the mistake lies in stating the ation between God and man in terms of *being*. It should be ted in terms of *existence*. Or, one may say that all discussion of s question is vitiated from the outset so long as we continue to ploy for the purpose categories drawn from the world of objects her than those appropriate to persons.

> 'The gravest defect of Hellenic and indeed of most early theology' was 'its subvervience to chemical and physical metaphors. . . . Instead of conceiving God in terms of love, in terms appropriate to personality, they are concerned with substances, with images borrowed from the fusion of metals or the mixing of liquids or the hybridizing of animals.'[2]

beral theology has long since broken with the excesses of this thod, it needs once for all to repudiate the method as such.

We have not done so as long as, for any purpose whatsoever, use language that implies that the relation between God and

[1] Alfred Hall: *James Martineau Selections* (Lindsey Press, 1950), p. 82.
[2] C. E. Raven: *Apollinarianism* (C.U.P., 1923), pp. 258f.

man is that between two substances or natures. We are in the gr of materialism once we do that. To be sure, language of this kin was appropriate enough for those who had been brought up Aristotle's physics and who regarded the heavenly bodies as con posed of a fifth element other than the four elements of whi everything in the terrestrial sphere is made up. On this vie there is a qualitative distinction between earth and heaven, tim and eternity, human and divine that is physical or at least quas physical in character. It is an opposition between two types things. These two can only be united therefore by sheer miracl the act that achieves the impossible by combining what in the nature are not susceptible of combination. The God-Man th becomes a hybrid, a person with two natures, so that disputes ari as to whether this carries with it the possession of two wills or one only. He is the Absurd, the Absolute Paradox of Kierk gaard, to be received only by the *sacrificium intellectus*. Whil in theory, there is nothing to prevent this miraculous union what cannot co-exist occurring again and again, when the conce tion is brought into relation with the historical figure of Jesus, inevitably becomes a once-for-all event.

In any criticism of this, it is insufficient to universalize th categories employed. What is required is that we reject the cat gories themselves. There is no such thing as a class of substanc under which God and man are to be subsumed, no such thing as nature that is to be found in one form in God and in another man. The distinction between God and man is of a different ord altogether. It is that between the Giver of life and that which constituted by the receipt of this gift. That, to be sure, wou apply at the sub-human level. At the human level, the only met physic that is valid is an existential one, a metaphysic, that is say, that recognizes that man is not a peculiar kind of object in th world, that he is subject, that he not only is but must continual do something about what he is. Man is freedom and responsibilit task and possibility and vocation. His relation to God is therefo not a constituent of his being but a potentiality the actualizatio of which is committed to his freedom, and which he may therefo refuse. In other words, the relation between the divine and th human is always to be conceived in personal terms, since it ethical through and through.

That being so, a conclusion of far-reaching import follow *There can be no relation between divine nature and human natu but only between God and individual human beings*. God and ma meet as God and this man in his freedom to choose God or refu him. Their meeting therefore does not take the form of th

sociation of divine nature with human nature by addition or inter-netration or some other process only applicable to things. It either (*a*) some overture on God's part and a response to it on an's or (*b*) some appeal on man's part and God's reply thereto. ne God-Man as an individual is thus a *contradictio in adjecto*. an exists as that being who is in conscious relation to God as ner than himself, who is free over against God, and for him to attached to God as one thing might be to another would be to stroy that freedom. He would therefore enter into the union t as man but as something quite different. It is noticeable that e traditional theology virtually admits that, for it grants that hrist was not *a man* but was *man*. That is to admit that the kind unity it asserts would be destructive of individual personality. would allow that and would go on to show that any divine-human ity must be so understood as to conserve individual personality.

What obscures this for many is that we tend to work with an roneous view of personality, one that actually removes the per-n and substitutes for it a special kind of thing. We do this nenever we think of personality in static rather than dynamic tegories. Let me illustrate this. When I am travelling by train e person who sits opposite me is merely one of the many objects at occupy space and time along with me in the compartment. e is a thing like the newspaper and the luncheon-tray, though mittedly he is not to be treated in the same way. When I speak or describe a person, I often do as I do in this case : I take as it ere a cross-section of his life that is accessible to me at the oment and equate that with him. My standpoint is that of the bserver for whom he is an object of knowledge. But now I lean rward and address my companion on the opposite seat, we get o conversation, we talk of our journey, our expectations, and hat has brought us to this moment. Now he becomes for me a rson in quite another sense. He is a flux of experience, an tivity moving out of the past through the present into the future. as we grow more intimate, each of us feels that he has gained mething from the encounter. A person, I now see, is neither alled off from others nor penetrable by them. A person is an tivity that is modified and redirected by its relation with other tivities of the same personal order. My relation to other persons one of giving and receiving, it is a drama with significant oments and fateful crises.

It is in this way that man is related to God and that he becomes ther united with him or separated from him. Man is not 'poten-lly divine,' as has often been said, for he is always the creature er against the Creator, holiness in him is always derivative

whereas in God it is primary. The highest form of unity that ente into our experience is that of love between persons, when tv become one while each remains himself, when indeed each on becomes fully himself in proportion as he achieves unity with th other. This ethical relation between the divine and the human the only one that is open to us. God is not substance, he is lov and we are one with him where love rules our hearts. 'God is lov and he that loveth abideth in God, and God in him.' We a united to God as we make his holy will our own, separated fro him as we assert ourselves against him in self-will. It is precise this unity with the Father that is predicated of Jesus in the Four Gospel. He does always the will of him that sent him, he is or with God in mind and heart and will.

All language that implies that God somehow inserts himse into human life as one might enter a room or that he is present it from the first as part of its natural equipment, is therefore mi leading. God's entry into human life can only take the form of a invitation to our freedom. He does not plant himself upon us b waits our consent. That is the meaning of freedom. Such uni with God as is possible to us is therefore not something we brin ready-made into the world at birth. What we possess initially a capacity for it, but that capacity is our freedom and not som thing-like ingredient of our nature. Equally, we may not thin of Jesus as supplied from birth with divine nature. He grew u into such incarnation as was achieved in him, and it was throug out ethically conditioned. God was in him in such measure as h opened himself to receive and obey him. As Martineau puts it, th incarnation is true of God *eternally*, but in the sense that he ever seeking to enter into individual human lives by the door their freedom. He knows no other way in. The possibility of so ship is *universal*, since the offer is made to every man in ever moment of his experience. And in each instance in which it attained it is *unique*. For the offer of the divine love is made each person in his unique situation and his response will accor ingly be unique.

It may be said that the term 'incarnation' is not strictly appli able to such a view as has been outlined here. I agree and woul prefer to see it abandoned, if only because it suggests a presen of God in human life that comes about by mere arrival there an not by an appeal to our freedom. But whether we retain it or no the question remains to be considered how the presence of Go in Jesus Christ is related to his presence in other men. Where lies the distinction between ourselves and him? Is it one of degr or of kind? Here again I suspect that we are employing categori

that are quite inappropriate to the subject under discussion. If I am a Christian, my relation to Christ does not permit me to take up the standpoint of the observer, still less does it allow me to lay myself alongside of him and estimate to a nicety how far he surpasses me. My indebtedness to him is too great for that, for in him I find God, myself, and my fellow-man. He is for me the point in history at which God becomes radiantly clear and inescapably challenging. He is the standard by which I seek continually to test my life. The traditional language, allowing me to call myself *a son* of God on condition that I acknowledge him as *the Son*, is true not only to the New Testament but also to religious experience with the Christian community. In shame, gratitude, and devotion I acknowledge in him the one whose unity with God is what mine should be but alas, is not.

AS WE ARE IN THE COUNTRY CHURCH*

By A Countryman

This article came into our possession from a layman who is a good friend of *The Layman*. The author desires to remain anonymous and the article is published without comment.

IN the past the real strength of the Church of England lay in her country parishes; to-day the country priest finds that his position is being steadily undermined and his very existence threatened both by enemies without, and by so-called friends within, the Establishment. In fact, we would bluntly maintain that unless these conditions are fully and frankly recognized for what they are, and then drastically remedied, the Country Church and the Country Parson, as they have been known, honoured and valued for centuries, will rapidly disappear. England will be all the poorer for their passing. Let us, then, carefully but fearlessly probe and analyze the present-day set-up.

Enemies Without

There is undoubtedly a growing weight of public opinion in the countryside that the parson is no longer necessary to the modern scene, and should be swept away into the limbo which has already engulfed his former ally and lay-opposite, the Squire. And for this at present largely inarticulate but none the less formidable

* We desire to thank the Editor of *The Layman* (Battle Hill, Goring, Reading) for his kind permission to republish this article, which appeared in its September issue. (Ed., *M.C.*)

state of affairs, we have to admit that the average country incumbent is himself partly to blame.

Are they Mass-produced?

Ordination candidates are conditioned to-day in a different social and theological world from that of their predecessors; and often the result tends to be a mass-produced, narrow-minded, but enthusiastic type, proudly exhibiting his party label and sincerely convinced that his methods are the only possible ones, even in the face of rapidly emptying churches. In real knowledge or ability he is probably sadly lacking, but makes up for that by 'busyness' and a commendable display of zeal. Energy, keenness, publicity and a fluent and persuasive tongue are, indeed, the tools of his trade. The old rectory is no longer an oasis of cultured and gracious living in an isolated and primitive village community; it has become instead a hive of industry: for raising money; for organizing the activities of a growing number of clerical societies; or as a village community centre. The garden is a wilderness, most of the rooms upstairs are shut up; but the study is alive as never before with the clack of the typewriter and the strident tinkle of the telephone. The rector is probably a youngish man, who has accepted his country living as the only one he can get, since he is tired of being an assistant-curate. He is full of plans and ideas, which make little impression upon his parishioners, as he no longer commands either their attention or obedience.

A Private Chapel

His services of a Sunday are sparsely attended; and his undisputed right to conduct them according to his own particular brand of churchmanship tends to turn the Parish Church more and more into his own private chapel. The organizations he runs may make an impressive list on the cover of his parish magazine, but their membership is small; the most flourishing is that of the Mothers' Union, sometimes composed of grandmothers. The vast majority of the male population, both young and old, is quite uninfluenced by him; and their propensity for playing football and cricket on a Sunday, visiting the cinema in the nearest town, gambling and loitering at the street corners, usually meets with his strong disapproval. However, he can do nothing about all this. His afternoon visiting is welcomed by the female population, provided it does not pretend to go any further than a little light gossip, with possibly a short prayer thrown in at the end. The most flourishing aspects of village life, such as the Women's Institute, the Youth Club, the Young Farmers' Club, the Cricket and Football Clubs,

and the Political Organizations are often almost untouched by the Church. The incumbent is no doubt on most of the local committees, the Parish and even the Rural District Council, but his voice is weak and is not heeded as in the days gone by.

An Isolated Life

Village life, in fact, is by-passing him; he is isolated in the large rectory, and consequently he tends more and more to focus his attention upon and direct his energies into channels beyond the boundaries of his parishes. It is easy enough to call to mind incumbents whose churches are empty, and are either disliked or ignored by their own flock at home; yet who play an important part in the life of the diocese or the Church Assembly. Others turn inwardly on themselves, devoting their long leisure hours to study, devotions and research. Others again may use their time to raise money for spectacular objects, and publicize their existence by stunts. Some, with the lawyer mind, have even been known to take a deliberate pleasure in fighting their parishioners over trifles. The author of that valuable little King Penguin, entitled *Life in an English Village*, has summed up the matter succinctly for us, on page 18, when he wrote: 'I think that in general it has to be conceded that too many parsons have forfeited their influence on village life.'

'Friends' Within

A Well-known Story

'There is nothing new,' declares the Archbishop of York, 'about the poverty of the clergy.' That, of course, is true, if we cast our minds back to the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; and always in every age there has been the 'poor parson.' But conditions again have changed; standards of comfort and culture have risen enormously; and what was tolerable to Dr. Primrose, or even to Josiah Crawley, are no longer endurable to-day. The modern country incumbent needs a living wage; and taking his peculiar circumstances into account, *viz.*, the amounts inevitably expended on collections, charities, parochial activities and entertainments; the large house and garden to be kept going; the heavy deductions for dilapidations and pensions; the necessity of keeping up 'appearances' in dress and hospitality; and his need of books and periodicals, a minimum stipend of £600 a year is essential, and yet only a minority of priests enjoy such an income. The Diocesan Authorities have recently made frantic efforts to increase them; but the result has been disappointing. Even a basic £500 per annum has often been hard to find. Consequently

there has followed retrenchment and economy where it is most to be regretted; in the size of the parsonage family, in the size of the parson's library, in the disappearance of domestic help, which ties the vicar and his wife down to domestic chores and gardening; but above all in the discouragement it is giving to, and the resulting loss of, many would-be ordination candidates.

A Material Future?

In the other great professions ability and hard work will almost inevitably bring their rewards in the shape of promotion and an increased income; but this is often far from the case in the Church of England, where promotion is rarely by merit, and incomes all too often are small and fixed. A clergyman does not adopt his vocation simply for what he can get out of it (although if he intends to marry and rear a family this factor must inevitably carry weight), but for the opportunity it gives him of contributing something of value to the community, in the Name of Christ. In his persuasive book, *Church and State in England*, the Archbishop of York is at great pains to point out that the so-called reforms he demands on the Church's behalf are urgently needed in order to give her the necessary liberty with which to combat a possibly Totalitarian State in the future. However, he omits to add that if granted they would go very far towards building up a Totalitarian Spirit within the Church. Cathedral Chapter appointed-bishops, the revised Prayer Book and Canon Law, the reformed Church courts and parochial system, would almost certainly deny to the clergy the independence which has been one of their chief characteristics throughout the centuries. For instance, the intelligent and discerning might-have-been ordination candidate realizes that before he can be accepted by his bishop he must first of all have passed the scrutiny of C.A.C.T.M., a clerical board that has apparently usurped the divine commission of the episcopate to choose the ministers of God. Secondly, at Ordination itself the Bishop may demand from him a promise that he will not marry, or at least defer marriage.[1]

The 'Super-Rector'

As an assistant curate he will naturally and properly be subject to the orders of the incumbent; but after he has served his apprenticeship and learnt his job, it is equally natural to expect a benefice

[1] At his Diocesan Conference in July, 1950, the Bishop of Winchester was reported as saying: 'They might have to consider asking young men entering the Church if they would be willing to postpone marriage until they had a church of their own.'

of his own. This may now very well be denied him; for under the Pastoral Reorganization Measure (1949) numbers of small villages will be grouped together and run from a common centre by a Super-rector and a band of assistant curates. A Report issued in 1950 by a committee appointed by the Church Assembly to consider the '*Mobility of the Clergy*' advised that a certain type of priest was not suitable for an independent cure; and a place must be permanently found for him as a curate in such a grouping. Presumably, then, these curates could be indefinitely denied both security of tenure and income, and also given no opportunity of developing their own ideas and experiments, unless they are first of all sanctioned by 'Authority.'

Worse may Follow

After perhaps twenty or thirty years' service the powers that be might deem him redundant, and cast him out of the fold to sink or swim as best he can. 'Priests,' we are told in that same Report, 'who have lost or mistaken their vocation must be told to relinquish the exercise of their orders.' How easily in practice this policy might be applied to the too independent man who was *persona non grata* with diocesan officialdom. 'It seems,' said one critic of this revolutionary proposal, 'that the idea, once a man has lost his vocation, is to push him out into industry. I wonder how industry will like it!' 'No one,' the Report blandly suggested, 'who has been called upon to relinquish the exercise of his orders need feel that his opportunities for good or for service are at an end.' The Church herself, nevertheless, will have washed her hands of such people.[2]

The above picture is scarcely encouraging for a young man of outstanding vision, character, and mental and physical abilities to enter the Anglican Church. The narrow paths of orthodoxy would cramp his feet; but if he strayed to right or left, the weight of officialdom would quickly see to it that he suffered for his rashness either by refusing him promotion into any position that automatically carried with it freedom of action; or, if absolutely necessary, push him out altogether.

The whole trend of the modern age is towards centralization, bureaucracy, and the eradication of individual initiative. All three are clearly to be seen at work in the Church of England since the beginning of the twentieth century, and have been greatly speeded up since the end of the Second World War. The setting up of the Church Assembly and the passing of the Enabling Act in 1919 cleared the ground for such a centralizing process. Hitherto each

[2] See *The Church Times*, June 23, 1950.

parish has been largely independent of and felt very little loyalty towards the diocese. Money raised was spent as the village itself, or rather its incumbent, determined; on its own needs or those of the Church at home or overseas. This sytem was ideal from the point of view of the flourishing, independently-minded village, although it has its limitations; but the diocesan authorities were not so well pleased. Consequently, through the Church Assembly, there has been built up a scheme whereby each parish is expected to pay a fixed quota to central funds. Discussing this financial revolution, Dr. Garbett admitted: 'There are very real dangers that too much thought and time may be given to finance, that undue burdens may be placed upon the clergy by repeated demands that the quota should be paid in full, and that excessive centralization in London may weaken the independence of the diocese.' Though both legally and theoretically the quota is a voluntary offering, the moral compulsion used to secure its payment is very great, and the incumbent is blamed if the parish fails to contribute the amount allotted to it. The same kind of pressure is brought on the dioceses if they do not annually send to London the sum for which they have been assessed.'[3] Apart from the quota, pressure is also brought to bear on the parishes to answer special appeals, such as those issued immediately after the late War in most dioceses; and the full weight of episcopal displeasure is visited upon the laggard and the unresponsive. But ever since the Enabling Act permitted the Church to force through Parliament measures that previously would never have got anywhere near the Statute Book, the Church Assembly has tended to undermine the independence and individual initiative of the parish priest, while vastly increasing the effective power of the bishops. The Editor of Crockford wrote in his Preface to the 1939 edition: 'Since the beginning of the present century there has been a rapid increase in the episcopate. Concurrently we have noticed a tendency to magnify the episcopal office in new and unfamiliar ways. Conspicuous amongst these is the bold assertion that the parochial clergy are no more than the delegates of the bishop.'

The passing of recent measures, the Reorganization Areas Measure (1944), the Benefices (Suspension of Presentation) Measure (1946), the Clergy Disability and Incumbents Discipline Measures (1946-1947), and most important of all the Pastoral Reorganization Measure (1949), have ensured that the number of independent cures will be drastically reduced, while they have also helped to undermine the security of the freehold. But more important still are other proposals which, although so far unem-

[3] Cyril Garbett, *Church and State in England*, pp. 176-7.

bodied in a measure, have already been advised by Church Assembly committees, and are being actively canvassed. These are: Terminable incumbencies, and the transfer of the parsonage house to the ownership of the diocesan dilapidations board. 'We propose,' wrote the anonymous authors of *Putting Our House in Order*, 'that after an incumbent had served a term of years in a parish, the bishop in council . . . should have the power to move him to another parish'; and 'That parsonage houses and their gardens should be vested in the Diocesan Board of Finance and be administered through the Dilapidations Board.'[4]

Another goal of ecclesiastical officialdom is to seek to destroy lay patronage and concentrate as much of it as possible in their own hands. A committee has already advised: 'that the diocesan Board of Patronage should be strengthened and patrons encouraged to transfer their advowsons to it.'[5]

Should these three objectives be achieved, then the destruction of the freehold would be almost complete.

Lip-service continues to be paid to the parochial system as the backbone of the Church of England; but the real, and practically undisguised policy of ecclesiastical authority, under the specious plea of financial stringency, is to seek to create a situation wherein the mass of the clergy, possessing neither security of tenure or income, can be sent where they are wanted, disciplined when they assert their independence, and warned never to aspire to anything beyond their present obscure status.

No man, least of all an historian, can foretell the future; but many signs proclaim that the existence of the Country Parson, as he has developed since the Reformation, is doomed. The countryside no longer needs him, and is largely indifferent to his passing. Almost certainly it will not pay the piper in order to retain him; whereas his ancient endowments, shorn by successive spoliations such as the Tithe Redemption Act, the Coal Act, the Redemption of Local Loans and the Nationalization of Railways, cannot suffice for his requirements.

But above all the Church herself, unless she is careful, may assist his passing by setting up in his place a pseudo-medieval system in which celibate curates, inhabiting centralized clergy-houses, administering wide country areas, and under the direct control of the official mind, will play a decisive part. Whether such a system could bring about a re-conversion of England, or indeed even work efficiently, only experience will reveal.

[4] pp. 87 and 112.
[5] Cyril Garbett, *Church and State in England*, p. 293.

TWO JESUITS

By Ralph Gardner, Vicar of Great Shelford

I

On the evening of 7 September, 1868, a slim, pale young man of 24 walked from the railway station at Roehampton to Manresa House. There he found himself among a dozen other newcomers, most of them younger than himself and several little more than schoolboys. He had taken the first step towards becoming a Jesuit.

Most of the younger ones had been dedicated from infancy to the priesthood and their schooling had been dominated by the intention that they should become Jesuits. Two or three of the older ones were converts from the Church of England, for those were the days when the example set by Newman twenty-two years earlier was still having an extensive influence. Of these, the pale young man, serious, sensitive, intellectual, was the most notable.

The child of a middle-class, cultivated Anglican family, he had gone to Oxford with the intention of being ordained. Under the tension set up by such varied influences as those of Jowett, Pater, Ruskin, Morris, Pusey and Liddon he was drawn into the Tractarian orbit, and forthwith became absorbed in the implications of the syllogism which had haunted Newman and so many others : ' If there is a God, He must have provided the world with an infallible Church to proclaim His truth and mediate His grace to a sinful world; and if there is only one body which claims to be infallible, that must be the Church.' Newman took six years of agonizing uncertainty before he arrived at the conviction that the premises were valid and the conclusion inescapable. Gerard Manley Hopkins, being more than twenty years younger than Newman, completed the mental journey in two. Doubtless Newman's *Apologia*, published while he was an undergraduate, hastened the process. He celebrated his submission to Rome by taking a Double First in Greats and earned from Jowett the title of ' the Star of Balliol ' for his outstanding proficiency in Greek scholarship. Newman himself had received the convert at Birmingham, and now, after two years of schoolmastering, he was embarked upon the Jesuit way.

We may wonder why Hopkins had decided for Jesuitry. He was shy, his health was poor, he was highly-strung. He had

written a good deal of not very remarkable poetry at Oxford, and although that is no uncommon thing with undergraduates, he had the temperament and even the look of a poet. One would have expected him to be drawn (supposing he had to become a Religious) to the 'gentlemanly and humanist' Benedictines or Oratorians. The Society of Jesus, with its militant ideals and methods, its reputation for extreme rigour and discipline, its repudiation of the more picturesque aspects of the religious life, would seem on the face of it to make it an uncongenial environment for such a man. Perhaps, on the other hand, it was in fact the note of practicality and militant energy which appealed to his earnest, shrinking, melancholy soul, as opposite is attracted to opposite.

After his arrival at Manresa House his outward course was that prescribed by the Society. A little senior to him in the noviciate was a 30-year-old ex-naval commander, Henry Schomberg Kerr, a man as different from Hopkins as can be imagined : tough, sailorly, energetic, with high executive talents and a distaste and incapacity for abstract thought. To this unlike and likeable man Hopkins felt drawn, as cerebral men are sometimes attracted by muscular ones, and they were associated for a good part of their Jesuit training. After two years at Roehampton, Hopkins went to Stonyhurst, the finely sited Jesuit College and seminary on the Yorkshire moors, for three years of philosophical studies; then, after another year at Roehampton teaching classics, he went to St. Beuno's College at Pantasaph in North Wales.

While there an event of decisive importance took place. Father Jones, the rector of St. Beuno's, encouraged him to write a poem on the subject of a wreck off the Welsh coast in which five Franciscan nuns had perished. Hitherto Hopkins had refrained from writing poetry, believing such an occupation to be inconsistent with his profession. But under the only sanction that could have weighed with him he released the torrent dammed up within and early in 1876 produced his longest and most famous poem, *The Wreck of the Deutschland*. Unknown to the world, a new and brilliant star appeared in the crowded firmament of English poetry. But it was to be obscured by clouds for many years.

Thereafter Hopkins composed poetry intermittently till the end of his short life. He wrote eagerly, passionately, haltingly, painstakingly, experimenting with new rhythms, crowding into his verse such qualities of richness and originality that most of the few who were permitted to see the results found them strange and even incomprehensible. There is no sign that anyone in the Society of Jesus recognized his quality as a poet, and he was the

last man to draw attention to it. He believed in his poetry, but Hopkins the poet was always secondary in his mind to Hopkins the Jesuit. His work went unpublished and those nearest to him thought it unpublishable. Such conditions might have been fatal to the exercise of his gift, for no creative writer can nourish the fire unless at least some others will warm themselves at it. He was rescued from fatal discouragement by the friendship and understanding of two men who stood outside the Society, and indeed outside the Roman Church itself.

Robert Bridges he had known as a fellow-undergraduate at Oxford. Canon R. W. Dixon had been a master at Highgate when he was a schoolboy. These men, both themselves poets, one a liberal-minded Anglican layman, the other an Anglican clergyman, recognized his quality and by their discerning kindness and companionship, exercised mainly by correspondence, gave him what he needed.

Meanwhile his Jesuit journey continued. In 1877 he was ordained priest, nine years after his first entrance at Manresa House. There followed four years of parish work in London, Oxford, Liverpool and Glasgow. Nowhere was he in any sense of the word successful as a parish priest. His earnestness and devotion were undoubted; his inveterate shyness, his hypersensitiveness, his recurring moods of melancholy, unfitted him for the exacting rough-and-tumble of parish organization and contacts. Perhaps he felt too much and too deeply the sorrows and stresses of the people with whom he had to deal. His superiors were plainly puzzled what to do with him. In 1882 they returned him to Stonyhurst to teach classics, and in 1884 appointed him Professor of Classics at University College, Dublin, the one vestige of what Newman had planned to be a Catholic university. His scholarship was obviously more than adequate for such a post; but melancholy and weariness pursued and gained upon him. In 1889 he died of enteric fever. He was 44.

So ended the earthly life of the Star of Balliol who had dedicated himself to the austere Jesuit vocation twenty years before. He was one of those who fail in all outward appearance to respond effectively to the moulding and inspiration of the Society of Jesus. There is no indication at any point that he ever regretted becoming a Roman Catholic or a Jesuit; no sign that he ever harboured a doubt of the truth of his religion. He just couldn't stay the pace he had set himself, and when his body was laid to rest in the Jesuit corner of the cemetery at Glasnevin it seemed likely that after a few years his name would mean nothing except to the small number of his associates and relatives.

But Robert Bridges possessed copies or originals of most of his poems. True, they were so 'queer' and unusual as to be unpublishable; but he managed to insinuate two or three of them into publications where he had influence, and he included several in his anthology *The Spirit of Man*. Nearly forty years went by — the memory of the author was no more than the shadow of a shade. But the world had changed; its outward shape had been torn by a vast war, the climate of thought and feeling had undergone a transformation. Bridges, with rare discernment, decided to lend his now considerable authority to a complete edition of the poems. The book appeared in 1918 and at first attracted little attention; but by 1930 people interested in poetry everywhere were reading it with excitement and admiration, and living poets were finding in what sounded like a new contemporary voice of song an inspiration and even a model for their own work. There was the strange phenomenon of anthologies of current English verse in which pride of place was given to a poet who had died while Tennyson and Browning still lived. Hopkins the poet had been discovered, and it is not a rash thing to say that to-day his place among the English poets — and a high place at that — is assured.

II

On 7 September, 1880, while Hopkins, twelve years a Jesuit, was working earnestly and painfully in a Liverpool slum, another young man, an Irishman, 19 years old, walked from Roehampton station to Manresa House, was shown into 'the dismal little guest-parlour,' and joined the small company of would-be novices. The proportion of 'Church-boys' — dedicated to the priesthood from infancy — was larger than in 1868, for the stream of Newmanite converts from Anglicanism had dwindled somewhat. The Irishman was like Hopkins only in his possession of a frail body and uncertain health. His background and mind were very different.

Born after the death of his father, a Dublin Protestant of high moral character, improvident ways, and uncertain temper, George Tyrrell had spent his childhood mainly with his mother, whose genteel poverty permitted her to provide him with no more than a casual education. He was confirmed in the Church of Ireland when he was 15 and became enamoured of the notion of Catholicism as it was hinted at by the bits and pieces of moderate High Churchism available in Dublin. Equipped with a questing, vigorous mind, moved by a hatred of shams and an eager desire to find and be of service to the truth, he soon felt himself drawn

towards the Church where Catholicism was genuinely at home and away from that in which it seemed an alien and disorderly growth disliked and denied by most of its members. Friendship with the naïve and lively Dolling, later to become a priest-hero of the Anglo-Catholics, only served to worsen his discontents. Even in London, where Anglo-Catholicism had some standing and the prestige of notable personalities, the impression of its unreality remained strong. He flounced out of St. Alban's, Holborn, while the Palm Sunday ceremonies were being performed with meticulous correctness and good taste before a crowd of well-dressed people drawn from all over London, and sought refuge at St. Etheldreda's, Ely Place, where the same things were being done in a slapdash way with an odorous congregation of Cockneys and Irish. St. Alban's, he felt, was bogus; St. Etheldreda's was the real thing — 'the old business, being carried on by the old firm, in the old ways.'

Tyrrell's path to Rome was therefore very different from Newman's and Hopkins's. Not for him the agonies of a prolonged attempt to evade the conclusion of a syllogism whose premises pointed to a Church thought to be alien and undesired. Newman and most of those who followed him began with theism and believed that irresistible processes of logic forced them into the Roman Church. Tyrrell began with Catholicism, and he could not rest until he had reached the place where Catholicism truly belonged. Newman, until he actually made his submission, felt unattracted and even repelled by Rome; his act, to him at least, was compelled by reason, and if anything against feeling. Tyrrell fell in love with Catholicism first, and then tortured and twisted his eager mind until it provided him with reasons for the step he desired to take.

Manresa House and the Jesuit noviciate followed almost as a matter of course. If Hopkins embraced the Jesuit vocation through the attraction of opposites, Tyrrell sought it because his spirit was akin to what he imagined to be the spirit of Jesuitry. If he had to be a Roman Catholic, he had to be the most militant, rigorous, and efficient kind of Roman Catholic possible. By all accounts that meant the Society of Jesus.

The process of disillusionment began early. As with many an infatuated lover, he expected and desired that there might be obstacles to overcome. The ideal ought not to be attained too easily. But Rome succumbed to his suit without a struggle, and the Society, essence of the ideal, was hardly less obliging. He records that he 'went out one afternoon with no intention of being received, and he returned a papist and half a Jesuit.' However,

the wise intervention of Father Jones (who five years previously had loosened Hopkins's poetic tongue at St. Beuno's) brought about a salutary delay. Tyrrell spent a few uneasy months in not very congenial company, first in Cyprus, then in Malta, testing his vocation to the Society before beginning his noviciate. The experience was lightened for him by the friendly mentorship of Father Kerr, who in 1868 had been a fellow-novice with Hopkins. Now at last, as he surveyed his companions in the refectory at Manresa House, he was really setting out on the Jesuit path.

Outwardly his noviciate followed much the same programme as that of Hopkins, and indeed of all Jesuit novices. During his second year at Roehampton, Father Hopkins returned there for his tertianship, the year of study and devotion which completes the training of a Jesuit. Doubtless the two men saw each other, but it is unlikely that the almost fully-fledged Jesuit of 37 had any personal contact with the 21-year-old second-year novice. In 1882 Tyrrell went to the seminary at Stonyhurst for the three years of study in philosophy. Throughout that period Hopkins was teaching classics at the College in the same grounds. In 1885 Tyrrell went to Malta to do the three years of teaching which Hopkins, at the same stage of his noviciate, had done at Stonyhurst. In 1888 he went on to the three years of study in theology at St. Beuno's, where he again met and confirmed his affection for Father Jones. While he was in North Wales, Hopkins, across the Irish Channel in Dublin, died. Neither man makes any written reference to the other though their paths had coincided at several points.

In 1891 Tyrrell was ordained priest. He returned to Roehampton for his tertianship; and after brief spells of pastoral work at Oxford (where Hopkins had also ministered) and St. Helen's, Lancashire, he was given a chair of philosophy at Stonyhurst. In 1896 he was sent to Farm Street, again treading in Hopkins's footsteps. Storms were gathering.

While in Malta in 1885 he had begun contributing articles to the Jesuit periodical *The Month*, and it became clear to his superiors that his gift for clothing religious ideas in a swift and lively prose indicated the best way in which the Society could use him. Hopkins had presented them with the problem of fitting an odd-shaped peg into one of the standardized Jesuit holes. There was no doubt that Tyrrell's 'shape' was that of a writer. Only later did it appear that as a writer he wasn't the correct Jesuit 'shape.'

His articles revealed a vitality of mind, an originality, and a disregard of the sacrosanct Scholastic categories, which began to

attract attention outside the Church and suspicion within it. Some of those Roman Catholics who had grown impatient of logic as the basis of theological method — of what Tyrrell styled 'theologism' — and who were at once stimulated and alarmed by the torrent of new knowledge descending upon the world in the name of Science, were quick to respond to this new note in Catholic theological writing. Friendships, discussion and correspondence, extending to France, Germany and Italy, were the result. The Modernist Movement was born — almost indeed stillborn. It never had any organisation. It was the phenomenon of a small number of able and questing Roman Catholics, priests and laymen, who were drawn loosely together by a community of ideas and a common desire to save the Church, as they believed, from itself.

Tyrrell's early articles were followed by books. His Jesuit superiors and the Church authorities generally, their suspicion once aroused, were watchful. Parts or passages of books submitted to them had to be omitted or altered before permission to publish was given. Even so it is interesting to look through books bearing the necessary *Imprimatur* and *Nihil Obstat*, and to note how much of them that was Modernist and Tyrrellian in form and spirit got through the tight mesh of ecclesiastical censorship.

But this could not go on for long. Not unnaturally he found himself increasingly at odds with his superiors in the Society and he was removed from London to the small Jesuit mission at Richmond, Yorkshire, in 1900, as a sanitary measure.

His membership of the Roman Church had begun as a love-affair. He had not ceased to love; but the nature of his love had been changed by close experience of the reality. He loved his Church deeply and cherished his membership of and priesthood in it; but the alluring ideal of courtship-days was now seen to be tarnished and faulty in fact: still lovable, still even desirable, but affronting to his conscience in its determination to resist the smallest change. He knew there were not a few inside the Church who rejoiced at his attempts to let fresh modern air into the dusty corridors of Scholastic theology; who longed with him to savour and enjoy the fruits of the Catholic tree without surrendering the integrity of their intellects. But they were a handful by contrast with the enormous mass of those who clung to the fixed tradition and feeble when pitted against the vast inertia of the institution.

By 1906 the quarrel reached its climax. The apparently irresistible force of Tyrrell's passion for truth met the immovable object of ecclesiastical conservatism. Something had to be broken, and it would not be the Church. There is moving drama

in the story. It needed immense courage for a priest to stand almost alone against the entrenched might of a Church that had been digging itself into history for nineteen centuries. Tyrrell was fearless, but he suffered intensely. Perhaps something of the Irishman's appetite for a fight against hopeless odds assisted him, but he brought to the battle a courage comparable with that of Hopkins, whose battle was fought within himself.

The Society of Jesus tore out the offending member and dismissed Tyrrell from its service and membership. In the summer of 1907 the Pope issued the decree *Lamentabili* and the Encyclical Letter *Pascendi*, condemning root and branch all that he and the small, scattered group of Modernists stood for. Still a Roman Catholic priest, he took the unprecedented course of answering the infallible Holy Father in the columns of *The Times*. Swiftly the final blow was struck and he was excommunicated.

Two years afterwards he died after a short illness. He was 48. On his death-bed, while unable to speak or signal, he was given conditional absolution and extreme unction by an anonymous priest-friend.

After his death his friends sought for him the privilege of Catholic burial, but it was denied him. He was buried in the Anglican Churchyard at Storrington and the Abbè Bremond, a dear friend, read prayers at the graveside. For this act of contumacy Bremond was forbidden to say Mass. The Roman Catholic Church is an austere mother.

III

There are curious likenesses between the careers of Hopkins and Tyrrell, and great differences. Of the likenesses it may be said that both were converts from Anglicanism, both suffered from ill-health all their lives, both became Jesuits, and both died before the age of 50. Both were writers, though of very different kinds. And both became widely known and influential through their writings outside the Roman Catholic Church.

Of Hopkins it may be said that the dependence of his fame on non-Catholics is complete. Without the friendship and understanding of Bridges his worth as a poet would never have been recognized. No one in the Society of Jesus knew that a notable poet had been among them till Bridges and the world told them so. Since then the Jesuits and the Roman Catholics generally have been eager to claim him as their own; in his lifetime he was for them rather a problem, and for long after his death hardly a memory.

Much has been written about the influence of his religion, and especially his Jesuitism, on his poetry. It has been suggested that his faith and vocation served to restrict his poetic development and that he is a name high among English poets to-day in spite of what his Church did to him. Others maintain that his Catholicism provided the conditions under which his poetic vision and power were brought to manifestation, and that the rigorous moulding of the Jesuit training gave to him the degree of inward tension most favourable to the flowering of his genius.

It is certainly difficult to imagine Hopkins as a whole-time poet or as other than a Catholic. His poems are so steeped in the colour of Catholicism, his subjects and images are so drawn from the substance of his beliefs, that a non-Catholic Hopkins is unthinkable. It was this fact that sometimes puzzled Bridges and even repelled him. It is astonishing that such a man as Hopkins was, in his time and place, should have written poetry in a vein and of a kind that needed a new climate of event and feeling for its appreciation — a mood, experience and attitude of mind not to be realised till he had been dead nearly half a century. But the truth probably is that the Catholic contention is right. They go too far when they suggest that the 'terrible sonnets,' in which he poured out with such terrific power his deepening moods of melancholy, were an expression of the mystical experience of the Dark Night of the Soul.

He was never a completely happy man (except perhaps on his death-bed); and the Society of Jesus seems to have treated him with less than the understanding its claims to holiness and divine assistance would seem to prescribe. But there is little doubt that the small but potent total of the poetic work he accomplished flowered from the soul of a man of rare sensibility, depth, and intelligence whose religion and calling gave him at once the materials of poetry and supplied the friction necessary to set them on fire. His almost pathological melancholy was the price he paid for the gift.

If he had lived another twenty years (he would only have been 64 when Tyrrell died) he would probably have approved the Church's action in regard to his Irish fellow-Jesuit. There is no reason to think he ever wavered in his conviction that the Roman Church was what it claimed to be, the divinely appointed custodian of truth and grace. But it is likely that Tyrrell, if he had ever had the chance, would have been readier to appreciate Hopkins. Tyrrell's chief instrument was his intellect; but he used it in the service of a mind that felt deep below the surface. He was excommunicated because he claimed the right to remain a Catholic

while interpreting the Church's formularies as symbols and approximations rather than as precise statements of historical and theological fact. Hopkins on the other hand worked with his intuition, and the language of poetry is intuition speaking through symbols. His surface-mind felt none of the intellectual difficulties that tortured Tyrrell, because below the surface he already saw and possessed what Tyrrell was trying to see and say with his reasoning mind.

Of the two it would seem that Hopkins will live longer in human honour. Tyrrell's books are little read to-day, though they still have a message for a world more troubled than the one he wrote for. The Modernist Movement was stamped out ruthlessly by a Church that studied totalitarian methods centuries before Hitler and Stalin were born; and to-day a catastrophic age is dallying again with catastrophic theologies. For theology is always provisional, despite the claim of Rome to have petrified it for all time. Poetry is universal or it is nothing.

The poetry of Hopkins is assured of an abiding place in English letters and his fame grows while that of the other fades. The theologian speaks the language of reason. He seeks to clothe the ineffable in logic and language fashioned for mundane traffic. In the voice of the poet human language becomes the fiery chariot of spirit, a veritable sacrament of the inwardness of things.

Tyrrell's contribution to theological thought was salutary in its day and has a place in the long and complex process of human thinking about God and life. The poems of Hopkins communicate immediate experience: *cor ad cor loquitur*. Melancholic though he was, perhaps because of it, he was one of those who know:

> The fine delight that fathers thought; the strong
> Spur, live and lancing like the blowpipe flame
> Breathes once and, quenchèd faster than it came,
> Leaves yet the mind a mother of immortal song.

NOTE. Works consulted include *The Note Books and Papers, the Letters, and Further Letters of Gerard Manley Hopkins*, published by O.U.P.; the *Poems* (2nd and 3rd editions), O.U.P.; Dr. W. H. Gardner's two volumes of *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Study of Poetic Idiosyncracy*; *Gerard Manley Hopkins, Priest and Poet*, by John Pick; *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Critical Essay*, by W. A. M. Peters, S.J.; *Gerard Manley Hopkins: A Life*, by Eleanor Ruggles; *Gerard Manley Hopkins: The Man and the Poet*, by K. R. Srinavasa Iyengar; *Gerard Manley Hopkins*, by the Kenyon Critics; *Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell*, by M. D. Petre (Arnold); *My Way of Faith*, by M. D. Petre; *The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church*, by A. R. Vidler; Tyrrell's writings, passim.

The lines quoted at the end are the first four of the poem 'To R.B.' No. 51 in the 2nd Edition of Hopkins's *Poems*.

IN MEMORIAM

John Nicholson Barran (1872–1952); Edward St. George Schomberg (1882–1952); Leonard Patterson (1886–1952); Francis James Wylie (1865–1952); Reginald Coupland (1884-1952)

(1)

The death of Sir John Barran, Bt., at Sawley Hall, Yorks, deprives the M.C.U. of a Vice-President who had been a member of its Council for over forty years. Educated at Winchester and Trinity College, Cambridge, he became a Liberal Member of Parliament in 1909 and held a remarkable succession of political posts — being Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Postmaster General, to the President of the Local Government Board, to the Home Secretary, to the Foreign Secretary and, last but not least, to Mr. Asquith, not only when he was Prime Minister but also in the years following on his resignation of the Premiership.

A great figure in the Yorkshire and London worlds of business, John Barran yet found time to support the cause of Liberal Churchmanship and undertook the duties of Hon. Treasurer of the M.C.U., and as Chancellor of our Exchequer earned the title of ' Black Michael.'

When the first Modern Churchmen's Annual Conference was held at Ripon in 1914, a few weeks before the outbreak of the First World War, we all attended a delightful garden party given by Sir John and Lady Barran at Sawley Hall on the heights above Fountains Abbey. Our charming hostess (the daughter of Dr. Leighton-Parks, a well-known Liberal Churchman and Rector of St. Bartholomew's, New York City) died in 1939. In 1946 Sir John married Esther Frances (daughter of the Hon. F. M. B. Fisher of New Zealand, the famous tennis champion), who survives him.

(2)

Edward St. George Schomberg, Vice-President of the M.C.U. and Master of Charterhouse, died on July 31.

Ordained in 1907, he served as Chaplain to the Forces in the First World War and was Mentioned in Dispatches. In 1917 he became Vicar of the important parish of St. Andrew's, Westminster. Henceforth the Metropolis was the centre of his active life. He served as Mayor of Westminster from 1931 to 1933, and as such was presented to George V at his Jubilee when the Mayors of England assembled to offer their congratulations. The King was curious to learn how it was possible for Schomberg to dis-

charge the duties of both Mayor of Westminster and Vicar of St. Andrew's, Westminster, at the same time, and invited Schomberg to luncheon in order that he might explain it.

In 1935 he became Master of Charterhouse and lived in that historic pile until he and Mrs. Schomberg were bombed out in the Second World War. Schomberg belonged to the family of the great Duke of Schomberg, who was killed at the battle of the Boyne and of whom William III said he would rather have lost the battle than have lost Schomberg.

In our Vice-President's dining-room hung a notable portrait in oils by Hogarth entitled 'The portrait of a naval officer.' Schomberg was the direct descendant of this naval officer, who had commanded the boats which transported Wolfe and his troops to the Plains of Abraham at the capture of Quebec. Schomberg possessed this naval officer's notebook containing diagrams of the *bateaux*. On examining it we remarked: 'This book ought to be in the British Museum.' Its owner replied: 'If you don't mind I had rather keep it myself.' We hope, however, that both the portrait and the notebook have come safely through the bombing of Charterhouse.

Schomberg served as a member of various metropolitan societies, particularly those connected with housing. His services at home and abroad were recognized by a number of decorations.

From 1918 to 1935 the Annual Communion services of the M.C.U. were celebrated at St. Andrew's Church, and on those occasions the Vicarage was the centre of generous hospitality.

To his widow and their two sons we offer our condolences.

(3)

Leonard Patterson, Vicar of St. George's, Campden Hill, London, a life member of the M.C.U., passed away on August 5, after a long illness. Ordained in 1910, his scholastic career was initiated by First Class Honours in the Classical Tripos at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was a Scholar. He took his Cambridge B.D. in 1921 and then in 1926 received the D.D. from Trinity College, Dublin. He held a number of posts — some pastoral, some academic. He was chaplain of Pembroke College, Cambridge, 1919-1920; Vice-Principal of Chichester Theological College, 1920-1925; Vice-Principal of Queen's College, Birmingham, 1925-1930. He produced two interesting volumes of religious research, *Mithraism and Christianity* (1921), *Theodore of Mopsuestia and Modern Thought* (1926). In some ways it was a pity that his many clerical duties did not permit him to produce more works of this class.

Only this year we received a letter from him with the significant remark:

> 'I should like to come to another Modern Churchmen's Conference, but that depends on the time of my annual holiday (generally a busman's variety).'

We publish in this issue of the *Modern Churchman* a letter contributed to our correspondence columns shortly before his death.

(4)

Sir Francis Wylie, for many years a member of the M.C.U., passed away at his home on Boars Hill on October 28. Originally a Balliol man, he was elected Tutor and Fellow of Brasenose in 1891 and in 1903 was appointed Secretary to the Rhodes Scholarship Trustees, a post which he held until his retirement in 1931.

His combination of academic, social and administrative qualities enabled him to make an outstanding success of what at the outset was regarded in the University as a dubious experiment. His achievement in this sphere was recognized by a knighthood conferred in 1929. During the Second World War he was a constant attendant at the morning Services at Ripon Hall Chapel, where his presence gave moral and spiritual support to our movement.

(5)

Another member of the M.C.U., Sir Reginald Coupland, K.C.M.G., a distinguished figure in the University of Oxford but known, as was Sir Francis Wylie, throughout the whole British Empire, died on November 6, on his way to South Africa, whither he was going to carry on his researches in that sphere in which he had become the greatest authority in the British Empire.

As Beit Professor in Colonial History, the chair which he held from 1920 to 1948, he achieved an amazing output of lectures, articles and books dealing with British colonial expansion — an account of which is contained in the column-long obituary notice of Sir Reginald in *The Times* of November 7. The political and economic aspect of this colonial expansion in Professor Coupland's earlier researches was supplemented in later years by his emphasis on its humanitarian and ethical effects and influences.

These five Modern Churchmen whom we here commemorate, so varied in their gifts and spheres of action, are characteristically representative of the membership of the Modern Churchmen's Union and are examples of those educated men and women who amid their many interests and occupations yet realize the claims of modern churchmanship on their loyalty and service.

H.D.A.M.

BOOK REVIEWS

DEVILS AND THEIR VICTIMS

Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum. How terrible are the atrocities which Religion has compelled men to perpetrate. This *dictum* of the pagan poet Lucretius is luridly illustrated by Aldous Huxley in his latest volume *The Devils of Loudun*[1]

The hero or rather the victim of the tragedy therein related was Urbain Grandier, Rector of Loudun, a small castellated town in the Diocese of Poitiers.

Born in 1596, educated at the Jesuit seminary in Bordeaux, Grandier became a secular priest and in 1623 was appointed to the important benefice of Saint-Pierre-du-Marché at Loudun and was at the same time made a Canon of the Holy Cross. An impressive personality, possessed of great social gifts and commanding eloquence, he soon became the chief centre of ecclesiastical influence in Loudun. Although energetic and conscientious in the discharge of his clerical duties, his private life was not that of a celibate. His laxity he defended to himself on the ground that the oath of celibacy, being unnatural, lacked moral authority, and that he had been compelled to take the oath under duress inasmuch as without taking it, he would not have been permitted to fulfil his vocation in Holy Orders.

Besides his moral laxity, his sense of self-importance made him intensely resentful of personal discourtesy which he never failed to retaliate with interest when the opportunity arose. As a consequence he ringed himself round with a host of enemies. In his position as parish priest he ignored the warning of the Spanish proverb: One enemy is too many; a hundred friends are too few. His greatest enemy however was Jeanne des Anges, the Head of a small Ursuline convent in Loudun whom however he had treated with correct courtesy but had, unknown to himself, given her mortal offence in declining, on account of his many pastoral duties to accept her invitation to become the Confessor and spiritual guide of her community. She, in combination with his enemies of every degree, including not only Grandier's bishop but the all-powerful Cardinal Richelieu, brought about the ruin of Grandier in a most extraordinary and horrifying manner. Whether her vindictive action was due to deliberate envy, hatred and malice or to erotic insanity, readers of Aldous Huxley's arresting but terrible volume will no doubt decide for themselves. The tragedy ended in Grandier, after two years of imprisonment and revolting tortures, under which he exhibited resolute constancy, being burnt alive at the stake at Loudun.

The Devils of Loudun testifies to the research which its composition has entailed. It is not strictly speaking a work of historical research and the author's imagination has been used to supply details of dialogue, environment and interpretation, but even where imagination plays this subordinate part in adding vitality and variety to the narrative, it is *historical* imagination and always loyal to the *historic* background and never perverts it. Its wealth of historic incident, the penetrating analysis, its citation of historical parallels is what we have learnt to expect from its author and we get it in this book in no small measure.

As the narrative is restricted to France in the first half of the seventeenth century and its outstanding characters are all members of the Roman Catholic

[1] *The Devils of Loudun.* (Chatto and Windus, 1952; 18/-.)

Church, Aldous Huxley's volume might therefore be regarded as an attack on Roman Catholic credulity in its attitude to sorcery and diabolical possession, but it ought to be remembered that in the demonic sphere Protestantism was as prone to fanatical superstition as was Romanism. It may be questioned whether Shakespeare—although he wrote *Macbeth*—believed in witchcraft and sorcery, but Shakespeare's contemporary, James I of England and VI of Scotland did so, as his studies in Demonology demonstrate and James has been dubbed, and not unjustly, 'The most learned fool in Christendom'. At St. Andrew's, Scotland, the pond is still pointed out in which witches were drowned as late as the middle of the eighteenth century.

In England John Wesley, Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford, not only believed in sorcery, but held that those who practised it, ought to be executed.

But behind all this is the New Testament in which belief in demons and demonization is basic and led the enemies of Jesus and John the Baptist to charge them with being demonised—a charge which Jesus declared to be, in His own case, sin against the Holy Ghost.

Bishop Butler seriously considered the problem whether a whole generation of human beings could go mad, and arrived at the melancholy conclusion, that it was possible.

Aldous Huxley's book can do good service, not by presenting man as a fallen creature, the urchin of Original Sin, but by teaching that a spiritual, moral and rational religion has an overwhelmingly important part to play in human education and progressive civilization. In Aldous Huxley's terrifying series of fanatics and lunatics and enslaved officials, the Sorbonne comes best out of the ordeal. Its Doctors of Divinity when petitioned in the seventeenth century to decide whether the evidence of the demonized ought to be allowed in the law-courts, decided that inasmuch as the Devil himself is the Father of Lies the demonized cannot be trusted to speak the truth, and that even if in giving evidence they should speak the truth, yet even then their evidence ought not to be admitted since Christ Himself commanded the demonized to be silent when testifying to Him as the Christ. (*Mk.* i; 34).

We venture to suggest that if readers of *The Devils of Loudun* have not already done so they should also read *The Perennial Philosophy* of Aldous Huxley. This would enable them to realize that he is not the enemy of spiritual religion but of superstitious and immoral fanaticism which there is good reason to believe was also the point of the protest of Lucretius when he wrote *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*

H.D.A.M.

GOD AT WORK*

Those who are acquainted with the works of Dr. Parkes will expect something inspiring from this book and they will not be disappointed. *God at Work* is an exposition of a much needed view of history which takes both God and Man into account and at the same time it is an important contribution towards a modern view of the doctrine of the Trinity. Dr. Parkes is a great believer in Power and he traces the working of the Power of God in history as flowing from three great centres—Sinai, Calvary and—but here he is held up for want of a definite historical event—humanism—The Renaissance. The Power that flows from Sinai moulds man in Society; the Power that flows from Calvary saves and satisfies the individual while the Power of the New Learning is leading to the understanding and conquest of man's environment. Dr. Parkes calls this last the Power of the Indwelling Spirit. These ideas are provocative and therefore fruitful. Of course the three modes of Divine

* *God at Work*, by Dr. James Parkes. (Putnam, 1952; 10/6.)

activity (one cannot help thinking of Sabellius—but there is nothing, even faintly, heretical about this book) are not mutually exclusive though they are essentially different.

It is a pleasure to differ from Dr .Parkes—no greater compliment could be paid him—and not everyone will agree with his account of any one of the three—Sinai, Calvary, Humanism. Moreover there are apparent contradictions left partially unresolved but these are small matters compared with the dynamic force displayed throughout the book. The last chapter is an astonishing and vigorous plea for the immediate establishment of a Residential Christian University. *Utinam prosit*—but it is to be hoped that such a University would open its doors rather wider than is advocated by Dr. Parkes.

Great emphasis is laid on the Sacraments, and apparently none are to be admitted to this University who cannot wholeheartedly join in the Eucharist. But these important matters might solve themselves if such a University came into being. Probably they would be solved and in the meantime attention should be drawn to the great defect of nearly all our Universities and Colleges at the present time. It is unusual nowadays for members of a whole college to meet together for any purpose whatever—even for dinner ! It was probably right to abolish compulsory Chapel—but it is high time for something to be devised to take its place—and this something should be of a dedicatory nature.

R.B.H.

PAUL TILLICH ON MODERN PROTESTANTISM *

In an age cankered by fear of events and distrust of thought it is not often that new books of significant philosophic theology can be reported. Here is one, by an influential German Protestant thinker who, driven from his own country in 1933, has for many years been teaching in the Union Theological Seminary, New York.

It consists of a number of articles written at different times and in different places. It has therefore the minor merits and major demerits of such a book. But it is to be welcomed. First, because it is the first substantial collection of Tillich's writings to be published in England. Second, because it may be taken as a kind of preface to his *Systematic Theology* which—as I am informed by the Director of Nisbet & Co.—is to appear in this country within a few months.

The themes dealt with here—Religion and History, Religion and Culture, Religion and Ethics, Protestantism, and The Present Crisis—are of interest, chiefly, for the light they throw on a Lutheran philosophic mind grappling with the issues of our revolutionary times. It may be taken as an interpretation of Protestantism, its dangers and its promises, its failures and its creative possibilities.

Dr. Tillich is concerned with ' the Protestant principle ', more than with Protestantism or the Protestant era. The inherent principle is rightly to be distinguished from its historical forms. Even as ' Catholicity ' is rightly to be distinguished from Catholicism or the Catholic era.

What is this ' Protestant principle '? It is ' not exhausted by any historical religion.' The Protestant principle, as expounded here, ' rejects " heteronomy " (represented by the doctrine of papal infallibility) as well as a self-complacent " autonomy " (represented by secular humanism).' I would add, in so far as I understand Dr. Tillich, that this ' Protestant principle ' rejects also the forms of ' dialectical theology ' as it has been promulgated during

* *The Protestant Era*, by Paul Tillich. (Nisbet; 21/-.)

the last generation in certain Protestant circles. Dialectics is the way of seeking for truth by talking with others from different points of view, through 'Yes' and 'No', until a 'Yes' has been reached which is hardened in the fire of many 'No's' and which unites the elements of truth promoted in the discussion.

> 'It is most unfortunate,' adds the author, 'that in recent years the name "dialectical theology" has been applied to a theology that is strongly opposed to any kind of dialectics and mediation and that constantly repeats the "Yes" to its own and the "No" to any other position.'

This mistaken 'dialectical theology' has unhappily issued in 'the cheap and clumsy way of dividing all theologians into naturalists and supernaturalists, or into liberals and orthodox.'

As distinguished from what Dr. Tillich calls (would it not be well for us all to drop such terms?) 'heteronomy' and 'autonomy', the 'Protestant principle' demands and represents 'a self-transcending autonomy, or theonomy.' This principle has been effective in all periods of history. It is revealed in all the great religions. It is incarnate in Jesus the Christ. It has been rediscovered time and again in the life of the Church. It was established as the sole foundation of the Churches of the Reformation. And it will challenge these Churches whenever they leave their foundation . . . In such, and similar words, the author expounds in a modern philosophic way such a view of Protestantism as has been expressed by many liberal thinkers—as, for example, in the Hibbert Lectures for 1883 on The Reformation by Charles Beard.

I conclude this notice of a stimulating book with these very true, and very truthful, words about 'doubt'.

> 'Not only he who is in sin but also he who is in doubt is justified through faith. The situation of doubt, even of doubt about God, need not separate us from God. There is faith in every serious doubt, namely, the faith in the truth as such, even if the only truth we can express is our lack of truth. But if this is experienced in its depth and as an ultimate concern, the divine is present; and he who doubts in such an attitude is "justified" in his thinking. So the paradox got hold of me that he who seriously denies God, affirms Him. Without it I could not have remained a theologian. There is, I soon realised, no place *beside* the divine, there is no possible atheism, there is no wall between the religious and the non-religious. The holy embraces both itself and the secular. Being religious is being unconditionally concerned, whether this concern expresses itself in secular or (in the narrower sense) religious forms.'

C. J. WRIGHT

EXTRACTS FROM ELEVEN LIVING RELIGIONS*

Of making anthologies drawn from various religions, there seems to be no end to-day; and behind this is probably the widespread idea that there is some good in all religions, and complete truth in none.

The present volume deals with 'the eleven living religions of the world': Hinduism, Shintoism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, Confucianism, Jainism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Sikhism. The order in which they

* *Readings from World Religions*, compiled by S. G. Champion, M.D. & Dorothy Short. (Watts & Co.; 18/-). Pp. 336.

are arranged is (we gather) intended to be roughly chronological; and this accounts for the position of Christianity as ninth in the series. The plan, however, clearly suggests that while religion in general is 'a Good Thing,' and an integral part of the history of the human race' (p. 5), the compiler does not himself adhere to any one of the eleven in particular, but 'presents them all simply, and with an equal lack of bias.' (p. v).

Each of the eleven sections begins with an introduction to the history and main tenets of the religion therein dealt with. These introductions are, on the whole, good and clear and are to be commended to anyone desiring such brief summaries. Next follows a series of 'Verses from the Scriptures' of each religion. These are arranged on a curious plan; one word in each verse being printed in heavy type as a somewhat arbitrarily-chosen key-word; and these key words placed in alphabetical order. The result is that the verses follow no sequence, of time or theme, *e.g.*, in the case of Judaism we find: Anger, Answer, Ant, Blemishes, Bless, . . . and so forth. After these verses come some longer extracts from the Scriptures, and these, for the most part, seem to have been well-chosen as typical and important passages. In some cases the extracts give an unduly favourable impression of the religion concerned; notably in the case of Islam, where the selected passages — many of them very fine — give little idea of the *lower* elements in the Qur'an. In the section on Christianity (pp. 195-246), both the introduction and the extracts are good and appreciative, though our Quaker friends may not wholly endorse the verdict that 'Christianity has been a great fighting religion.' (p. 204).

While commending the book to general readers as a useful introduction to a vast subject, we do not think it will satisfy the scholar of critical mind. The Foreword assures us that Dr. Gurney Champion has already written 'an authoritative work' on 'The Eleven Religions' in 1944, but no indication is given of his qualifications for this and somehow the work lacks the 'touch' of careful scholarship. In the extracts, references are indeed given to chapter and verse, but we have found no indication of the translations used: and often, an English word does not by itself fully express the meaning of the original. For instance, in the section on Buddhism, we are told first of 'the supremacy of love' (p. 169), and then that the true Buddhist is one 'to whom there are no affections whatever.' (p. 190). One would like to know whether 'love' and 'affections' truly express the meaning of the original Pali; for to an English reader it is hard to reconcile the ideal of 'the supremacy of love' with the ideal of 'no affections whatever'! Some of the statements are open to question: for example, that 'it was only later than Nehemiah that the Jews began to look on themselves as the Chosen People' (p. 50); and it is at least surprising to be told that while first among the duties of a good Muslim is the recitation of the Kalimah ('There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the Prophet of Allah'), 'this need only be done once in a lifetime.' (p. 258).

To many readers, the sections on the less well-known religions — Shintoism, Taoism, Sikhism — will be the most useful and informing in the book.

E. Dewick

A BOOK OF UNCOMMON PRAYERS*

Books of prayer abound. Books about prayer are even more numerous. It is not easy therefore to compose anything original in this sphere. Nevertheless, those who read Fr. Gille's little book, *More Professional Prayers*, will feel that he has given us something on prayer which is entirely worth

* The Rev. A. Gille, D.D., Ph.D.: *More Professional Prayers.* (Newport R. H. Johns Ltd., 1951; 4/6.)

while. We venture to cite two examples of his unprofessional prayers. They are not the most original nor the most humorous in his book, but they have something to teach both classes to whom they are offered.

First, *The Parish Priest's Prayer*:

> 'Great St. Peter, who for all your greatness, could take the good with the bad, could be called "Rock of the Church" and "Satan" with equal serenity, and refrained from punishing St. Paul for giving you lip, it is from you I wish to learn how to be a priest without forgetting I am only a man; how to show the way to Heaven without keeping the key in my pocket; how to help souls without damage to my own. First make me democratically humble, theologically careful, morally irreproachable, pastorally vigilant and liturgically correct. Habit is my dope, comfort my temptation and vanity my pitfall. Yet I know I have as much to learn from my flock as I can teach it. It is so difficult to dispense God's gifts without making them my own, and to dispense my opinions without making them God's; to lead my people to God's throne without actually trying to sit on it. You were so convincing as a Pope, because you never forgot you started as a workman. O could I but forget that I started as a gentleman.—Amen.'

Secondly, *The Atheist's Prayer*:

> 'God of my wife, I have not the faith, but she tells me to use my imagination, since I may be wrong, in which case I owe you my apologies. I do offer these with all my heart; and I may add, I would be only too glad to believe, if I could see but a little more charity among those who call themselves the children of God. However I am probably no better. I know there is no sense in talking like this, but my wife loves you, and the wide space this seems to open out to her makes me feel shrinking to the narrowness of my material being. Are you hiding? Am I blind? Do I lack the sense of the invisible? I do not know, but if I am wrong, I am sorry.—Amen.'

Lady Margaret Sackville has written a discerning and sympathetic Preface to this little volume.

H.D.A.M.

A NEW DIATESSARON

Mr. Freeman Wills Crofts does not make any precedent as a writer of detective fiction who turns to the reconstruction of the Gospel story.[1] Such a writer is well equipped for the task at least in so far as it calls for ingenuity and imagination. On the other hand he may easily be tempted to change history into melodrama and confuse sensationalism with realism. But, though by no means lacking in ingenuity, Mr. Crofts succeeds entirely in avoiding both these dangers. In a good, plain, colloquial style, he re-writes the Four Gospels as a single consecutive narrative. This he divides into seventeen chapters, to each of which a copious series of notes is appended. Most of these give the literal rendering of passages where a paraphrase has been adopted, while others provide simple explanations of obscure points and difficulties.

The method may not be one of which the scholar would approve. It is in no way scientific and the translation is based entirely on the English versions.

[1] *The Four Gospels in One Story*, by Freeman Wills Crofts (Longmans, 1949. Cloth boards, 8/6; Paper, 5/-).

But though Mr. Crofts reflects a most regrettable lack of sympathy with the science of Biblical Criticism (p. ix) his book is not, of course, designed for scholars.

> 'The work,' he tells us, 'at first was carried out purely as a hobby, and it was not until it was approaching completion that the writer began to wonder what had so greatly enlarged his own knowledge of the subject might not be helpful to others also . . . Experience having shown that contact with Christ changes people's nature . . . the writer ventures also to hope that in this simplified form the story may bring that contact to some to whom the Authorised Version may not have appealed . . . It is further hoped that the book may prove useful to students, schoolmasters, Sunday-school teachers, persons leading study circles and others' (p. x).

Many of these people will undoubtedly be very grateful to Mr. Crofts for what he has done. It may be observed that the writer of this review was glad to use the book in Church on Good Friday in order to read the story of the Passion to a country congregation.

Perhaps it would have been better if the Fourth Gospel had not been included in this harmony, but in weaving it into the Synoptic record Mr. Crofts can claim the support of that distinguished modern critic, the late Dr. C. J. Cadoux, of whose *Life of Jesus* he has, in fact, made considerable use.

Questions of critical interpretation are not wholly ignored, even though the purpose of the book is not critical. Thus of the Virgin Birth, Mr. Crofts writes:

> '1. Those who believe it literally occurred point out:
>
> (*a*) Two passages, Mt. 1: 18-25 and Lk. 1:34-35 state unequivocally that it did.
>
> (*b*) A number of other passages can be interpreted to mean the same thing.
>
> 2. Those who do not believe in its literal occurrence assert that it was a claim frequently made at the time at which Christ lived, and stress the following:
>
> (*a*) There is no other unequivocal reference to it anywhere in the New Testament. Our Lord never claimed it, neither St. Mark nor St. John mention it, St. Paul does not seem to know of it.
>
> (*b*) The passages referred to in 1 (*b*) can be interpreted equally satisfactorily if it did not occur.
>
> (*c*) In both Mathew and Luke genealogies of Christ are given to prove he is the son of David. In both these Joseph is given as his father.
>
> (*d*) Mary and Joseph are spoken of as Christ's "parents" (Lk. 2: 27, 41, 43 (R.V.)) and as "his father and mother" (Lk. 2: 33, 48).
>
> (*e*) In the Old Testament reference, "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son" . . . the word "virgin" is a mistranslation. The original Hebrew had simply "a young woman."' (pp. 12-13).

In a similar way on the subject of miracles in general the usual arguments *pro* and *con* are summarised, and the reader is left to make his own decision.

The style of the book, lively, very readable, yet not out of keeping with its subject matter may be indicated by two or three more or less random passages:

> 'That same evening Jesus again reached the lake. A number of boats lay along the shore, and wishing to escape from the crowds, He got into one with His disciples.

"Let us cross to the other side," He directed, and at once they set out. Jesus, tired from His day, lay down on a cushion in the stern and fell asleep.

Presently a sudden heavy squall swept down on them from the hills. The waves quickly rose and they began to ship water. Soon the boat was filling, and they were in danger of foundering. Jesus had not awakened, but now the disciples cried out to Him.

"Master, Master, we're sinking! Don't you care if we drown? Save us!"

Then He awoke, He got up and reproved the wind. "Peace!" He said to the water. "Be still."

Immediately the storm passed as quickly as it had risen, the waves went down and there was a flat calm.' (p. 83).

'"Now," said Jesus, "whoever has a purse should take it and a knapsack also. And whoever hasn't a sword should sell his coat and buy one . . ."

"See, Master," they pointed out, "here are two swords."

"Very well," he told them. "Enough about that."' (p. 227).

When they had finished Jesus put a question to Peter.

"Simon Bar-Jonah, do you love me more than do these others?"

"Yes, Master," answered Peter, "you know I love you."

"Then feed my lambs."

There was a pause and Jesus spoke again:

"Simon Bar-Jonah, you do really love me?"

"You know I do, Master," Peter repeated earnestly.

"Then look after my sheep."

Once again there came a pause, and for the third time Jesus repeated his question:

"Simon Bar-Jonah, you're sure you do really love me?"

At this further repetition, Peter felt hurt.

"Master," he protested, "you know everything. You know how much I love you."' (p. 254).

Sometimes, where the meaning of a passage is doubtful, and the Evangelists do not agree, Mr. Crofts wisely adopts whichever is most reasonable. Thus in the 'that seeing they may see and not percieve' passage (Mark iv, 12) he follows Matthew and renders it:

'To them I speak in parables because they are so spiritually dull and ignorant that they would be completely alienated by plain language.' (p. 74).

Altogether, within the limits of its purpose, this is an admirable book. It is infinitely better than most of the small popular Lives of Jesus, and the plays and novels supposedly based upon that Life. Here we have, in fact, the plain and unadulterated Gospel story, presented in a form which should be of great assistance to many Christians, and would-be Christians, to whom the language of the Authorised Version is only partially intelligible, and who would be unlikely to read the New Testament in an ordinary modern translation. Similarly, it may well prove of value to those — clergy, teachers and others — whose task it is to make ordinary folk more fully acquainted with the story of Jesus of Nazareth.

There is an excellent cross reference system at the end of the book which enables the reader to refer to each of the Four Gospels from any point in the book at which he may happen to be reading and *vice versa*. There is also a comprehensive index. The fact that these together occupy more than 70 pages is an indication of how complete they are.

The compilation of the book has obviously been a labour of love and one can well believe Mr. Crofts when he says that 'it greatly enlarged my own knowledge of the subject.' If it is read and used as widely as it deserves to be his hope that it may 'prove helpful to others also' will certainly be fulfilled.

D. L. Scott

CHRIST AND TIME*

The original German edition of this work, entitled *Christus und die Zeit* (Zürich, 1946), was noticed at length by the present writer in an article in *The Modern Churchman* in 1948[1]. Since its publication Professor Cullmann's book has enjoyed an increasing reputation; a French translation has appeared and now the English-speaking world has this English version made by Professor Floyd V. Filson. It is good that this book should thus be made available to a wide public, for it is important; however, from the welcome which it has received in some circles in this country there is reason for asking whether its real significance is not in danger of being misunderstood and that it may be used to give a further impetus to a certain unfortunate development of theological thought.

The value of Professor Cullmann's study lies essentially in its acute analysis and lucid exposition of the interpretation of so-called History which is implicit in the documents of the apostolic and sub-apostolic era: the author's own subtitle, in translation, is: *The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History*. In his exposition Professor Cullmann shows that the early Christians conceived of the temporal process, not in terms of the recurrent cycles of Hellenist thought, but as an 'upward sloping line' (*aufsteigende Linie*), which was the expression in time of the unfolding of the Divine Purpose: history for them, moreover, was 'redemptive history' (*Heilsgeschichte*), since the temporal manifestation of God's Purpose was directed to the Salvation of Man. Accordingly, these primitive Christians had no interest in the manifold affairs of mankind, which constitute the subject matter of secular history; instead, they took over the Old Testament interpretation of the past and adapted it to the peculiar interpretation of the status and career of Jesus of Nazareth from which Christianity derived its initial sanction and authority.

In this adaptation lay the uniqueness of the Christian view of Time. As Professor Cullmann puts it:

> 'An event of the past, the death and resurrection of Christ, is regarded as the decisive mid-point of the entire line of revelation, and in this way the connection of the future with what has previously happened is no longer left vague and undefined; rather now for the first time, on the basis of the fixed orientation to that *mid-point in time*, the line can be clearly drawn from the beginning on, in its unbroken continuity. The point of view that redemptive history presents is indeed found in the Old Testament, but nevertheless only in a preparatory way; it can be constructed into a straight and complete line only in the light of the fulfilment which has already taken place in time, in the death and resurrection of Christ' (p. 59).

The author works out this difference in a more detailed schematic form. He shows that the Jewish concept of the temporal process was twofold: in the one the 'time line' (*Zeitlinie*) divided into three sections, namely, time before the Creation, time from the Creation to the Parousia, and time after the

Christ and Time by O. Cullmann. English Trans. (S.C.M. Press, London. 1951. Pp. 253. Price 18/-.)

[1] Vol. xxxviii, pp. 124-132: 'The Historical Element in Christianity.'

Parousia; but this pattern was paralleled by another which derived from Iranian tradition whereby the *Zeitlinie* was bisected into 'this age' and 'the coming one'—the division being made by the coming of the Messiah. In the Christian view this twofold Jewish scheme was significantly changed, for 'the faith of Primitive Christianity consists in the fact that *for the believing Christian the mid-point, since Easter, no longer lies in the future.*' Hence the Christian believed that he was living in the third period of the temporal process, the time from the Parousia to the end—in the death and resurrection of Christ the decisive turning point had been reached, and, in the words of Cullmann, '*Die Gegenwart der Kirche ist die Zeit zwischen der gefallenen Entscheidungschlacht und dem Victory Day*' ('The present period of the Church is the time between the decisive battle, which has already occurred, and the "Victory Day",' E.T., p. 145).

An important paragraph concerning the early Christian evaluation of history as prophecy ends with a sentence which aptly sums up the fundamental issue of Professor Cullmann's study. It reads in the present version (its meaning might have been made clearer, if it had been more freely translated[2]):

> 'Without the presupposition of a revelation such a presentation of history is meaningless, and the interpretation which it gives of the history, that is, the thing that is the essential in it and that influences the entire presentation, can only be believed' (p. 98).

Here we meet with the assumption of a criterion by Professor Cullman, the fact of which must be properly faced and appreciated, if his study is to be evaluated aright.

Professor Cullmann clearly shows near the beginning of his book that the 'history' with which he is concerned, *i.e.* the New Testament *Heilsgeschichte*, is in fact a peculiar interpretation of a selection of 'events,' some of which are purely mythical while others derive from happenings which occurred at a specific time and place. The irrationality of this interpretation is disguised by designating it 'theological.' Thus he writes:

> 'The problem of Biblical history here emerges as a *theological* problem. For although individual basic facts of this Biblical history are subject to historical investigation, yet as a whole, in its grouping, interpretation, and joining of events with the historical action of Jesus, it takes on meaning only when this central historical action of Jesus of Nazareth is recognized as *absolute divine revelation* to men. Without this faith, not only is it impossible to ascribe any normative value to that entire Biblical history, but that history must actually seem to be without meaning' (pp. 22-3).

The constitutent data of this *Heilsgeschichte* are described in the course of an examination of the New Testament terminology for time. The Greek word *kairos* is held to supply the basic concept, its definition in secular usage being 'the moment in time which is especially favourable for an undertaking.' Professor Cullmann continues:

> 'The New Testament usage with reference to redemptive history is the same. Here, however, it is not human deliberations but a divine decision that makes this or that date a *kairos*, a point of time that has a special place in the execution of God's plan of salvation. Because the realization of the divine plan of salvation is bound to such time points or *kairoi* chosen by God, therefore it is a redemptive history' (pp. 39-40).

[2] The German original (p. 85) reads as follows: '*Ohne die Voraussetzung einer Offenbarung ist solche Geschichtsdarstellung sinnlos, und die Deutung, die sie von der Geschichte gibt d.h. das, was das Wesentliche daran ist und die ganze Darstellung beeinflusst, kann nur geglaubt werden.*'

Professor Cullmann's position here is surely open to two obvious lines of attack. The first must be on the ground of what constitutes a historical fact. The criticism of Croce and Collingwood no longer permits the answer that history is concerned with 'the fact in itself,' *wie es eigentlich gewesen*, as Ranke defined it. It is now realised that pure historical facts, existing as it were *per se*, are figments of the so-called scientific historian's imagination. Every historical event is in origin an inextricable compound of a perception of some definitive change in the presentation of phenomena to some human observer and the interpretation of the significance of that perception by the subject of it. The task of the historian is to account as fully as he can for all the factors operative in that initial act of interpretation. Hence arises the basic problem of the validity of the New Testament *kairoi*, as described by Professor Cullmann: in other words, what are we to say to an assertion that

> 'it is not human deliberations but a divine decision that makes this or that date a *kairos*, a point of time that has a special place in the execution of God's plan of salvation?'

There seems to be one answer only to the man who makes such an assertion, namely, 'how do you know of divine decisions?' And here we surely reach a *ne plus ultra*, when the inevitable reply comes: 'by faith.'

The second line along which Professor Cullmann invites attack is in his use of the New Testament sources. He takes their respective testimony about the concept of Time without considering the deeper question of how the interpretative pattern, which he believes may be deduced from them as a whole, originated in its constituent parts. This is an immense subject on which the present writer has his own distinctive views,[3] and he may do no more here than to state his opinion (i) that the Christian emphasis upon the historicity of the crucial events of the career of Jesus was not original, but fortuitously emerged from the aftermath of the events of A.D. 70; (ii) that the taking over of the Hebrew *Heilsgeschichte* and its ultimate incorporation into a Christian philosophy of History is to be traced to Paul's momentous identification of those who accepted the Gospel as the True Israel — an identification which was originally an adroit move to solve the problem constituted by the persistent obduracy of the Jews towards the claims of Jesus.

In conclusion it may be fairly said that this work of Professor Cullmann raises in a particularly sharp form a matter of fundamental concern. Its crux lies in the basic premise of what has become orthodox Christianity, namely, that certain events which took place in the first three decades of the present era in Palestine had an intrinsic significance such that the whole temporal process from its putative beginning can only properly be understood in terms of it. The *skandalon*, which such a proposition constitutes, is frankly acknowledged by Professor Cullmann, but he seeks to avoid the challenge of its logic by making apprehension of the proposition a matter of faith. However, such an attempt to remove the Christian claim from the obligation of facing judgment in the forum of scientific history is not legitimate, and it will ever be made in vain; for on the final analysis Christianity derives its authority from certain historical events and those events are the proper subject for historical investigation, and, what is equally essential, any interpretation which may be placed upon them must justify itself in the light of the conclusions reached by such investigation.

S. G. F. Brandon

University of Manchester.

[3] They are set out in his *Time and Mankind*, pp. 159-176, and *The Fall of Jerusalem and the Christian Church*, chapter X.

EVOLUTION OF LAW AND SOCIETY*

Dr. Diamond in his very interesting book traces the development of law in human society from the primitive food-gatherers before agriculture began right down to the modern age. Such a collection of material, set forth as this is, in well-arranged sections and in a readable style, will interest not only anthropologists and lawyers but also the inquiring layman.

The Food-gatherers, in whose territory a man might travel for four and more days without meeting a single human being, might be expected to conduct their affairs without the encumbrance of law. And there is but a vague beginning of it — in marriage customs, for example, rules which are binding on the community. When a community is small, public opinion has a strength which it does not possess at a later stage to deter the would-be offender, and courts are not necessary save of an informal kind. Moreover, strange as it may seem to our more civilised epoch, serious offences against order, whether murder or theft, are rare among people like the Trobriand Islanders, who are at the agricultural stage of development.

In the latter part of the third millennium B.C. Babylonia was economically and legally in advance of the rest of the world. From the Third Dynasty of Ur many private legal documents in the form of clay tablets survive, for important transactions were already recorded in writing. In 1947 was discovered the code of law of a small feudal state, Eshnunna, written in the Accadian language, which is our earliest extant code of laws (2000 B.C.) — earlier than Hammurabi's Code (1750 B.C.). This latter 'is one of the world's great legal landmarks,' and almost alone of all ancient codes, it survives on the very stele of black diorite on which it was published. It is a long compilation of 282 clauses. Further south, and dating from a later age, on the outskirts of Babylonian and Egyptian influence, a Hebrew code of law survives in *Exodus* xxi, 2 to xxii, 17. The Code may date from the ninth century B.C., though in its present form it has been brought up to date in the fourth century B.C. Of the laws and contracts of early Egypt, little remains, for papyrus is not so lasting a material as the clay tablet, and the Egyptian economy was less developed than the Babylonian.

In England the earliest compilation of laws, is the Code of Ethelbert, about 600 A.D., referred to by Bede, who speaks of it as comprising 'decrees of judgments (*decreta judiciorum*) which are still kept and observed.' At a later stage, when villages, towns and organised markets are to be found, and when religion is well-developed and organised, and a powerful force, then the pledging of persons for debt begins, while in the field of administration feudalism reaches its apex. The rise of a costly and specialised type of military equipment limited its use to holders of landed estates which they held on tenure of service (the cost of a war horse and equipment was equal to that of over 20 oxen). The ecclesiastical orders in Europe at this period had achieved considerable legal functions. Virtually the sole repositories of learning, with a monopoly of the practice of writing, they recorded the legal usages of the State and advised the King on legal matters. Ecclesiastics were high civil servants and the Church tried defendants for a number of criminal offences, *e.g.* witchcraft, adultery, incest and so on.

Not the least interesting aspect of Dr. Diamond's work is that he examines cultures existing at different epochs and in different parts of the world but standing at the same stage of development. For example, what he terms the period of the Late Codes is represented in England of 1100-1300, in Rome at the time of the so-called Twelve Tables, in Athens at the time of Draco and

* *The Evolution of Law and Order.* By A. S. Diamond. (Watts. 21/-). *Social Evolution.* By Gordon Childe. (Watts. 10/6. 1951.)

his code, while the Middle Assyrian Code of about 1400 B.C. belongs to the same stage of advance. Besides Europe and Asia, Africa and South and Central America (before the Spaniards' advent) come into the picture.

Professor Gordon Childe is not a supporter of what is known as the 'diffusionist' theory, associated with the names of Elliot Smith and W. J Perry according to which all civilisation spread everywhere from the Nile Valley. Savages are represented by Diffusionists as totally without initiative, without the desire or the capacity for inventing a device, a myth, or an institution. This seems to be contrary to the facts; and an alien civilisation, especially if it be 'superior,' does the savage more harm than good — as in Polynesia, destroying his myths, his institutions, his whole culture. And as for Egypt having been the world's teacher, metallurgy is as old in Hither Asia as on the Nile. And so with other constituents of Egyptian civilisation and their relations with the Sumerian.

Nor does Professor Childe agree with those sociologists who hold that matrilinear succession confers on the woman a higher status than they enjoy in patriarchal societies. The conception of matriarchy seems to him to be exaggerated. Certain small effigies of a female personage have been taken as indications of a matriarchal society in the Neolithic age; but they may be connected with some fertility ritual, and to represent in some way the Earth Mother. Yet may not the cult of such a deity be an indication of matriarchalism, as the worship of a Sky Father is a feature of a patriarchal society?

It would appear that social evolution affords less clear parallels with biological evolution than Herbert Spencer imagined. A comparison of the sequences summarised in these chapters discloses not only divergence and differentiation -- phenomena familiar in biological evolution — but also convergence and assimilation. Cultural changes also take place far more expeditiously than do biological changes. Diffusion is not an automatic process, but one society can consciously borrow from another an idea — a technical invention, a political institution, a religious rite, but only when it fits into the general pattern of the borrower's culture. Cultural evolution does indeed take place, but there is no close analogy between it and evolution in the biological sphere.

Professor Childe observes on his closing page that there is no need to assume supernatural interpositions to account for cultural evolution. In a scientific treatise it would seem hardly necessary to make such an observation — save for purposes of secularist propaganda. That is rather a question for the philosopher to tackle. And the term 'supernatural' needs definition. Is the inspiration of genius, on which human progress has depended, to be accounted 'supernatural?' And if not, why not?'

Professor Childe's book will be of great interest to the student of cultural origins.

J.C.H.

CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALISM

A Book of Preparation for the Coming Life[1] is a small volume of spiritualistic meditations subconsciously transcribed by its author, a devout churchwoman who believed herself to be the subject of religious guidance and prophetic inspiration by saintly Christian beings dwelling in the celestial world. These celestial beings include not only St. John and St. Andrew and St. Mary but also non-New Testament saints of dubious historical existence such as St. George, St. Nicholas and St. Christopher.

[1] *A Book of Preparation for the Coming Life* by R.M.T. (Author of *Letters from Christopher and Letters from Lancelot*). (Skeffington and Son, 1951; 9/6.)

The tone of the book is intensely Christian in its thought of the Divine Being and in its conception of Christian character and duty. It is written in pure English and in its rhythms passes at times into blank verse. Theologically its outlook is that of an enlightened modern mysticism. Its exegesis of Christ's parables is uninfluenced by New Testament criticism, but its concept of the potency and promise of the creative process is that of a spiritual Christian optimism.

The following citations will give a truer indication of the character of this volume than generalisations about it.

> 'Many disbelieve but those who now have scientific proof and therefore knowledge, grow in number daily; so will a multitude believe ere long in truer fashion than of old, with greater knowledge. Fear not then the present unbelief; this is now but the retreating wave before a surer knowledge comes than aught in history.' (p. 88).
>
> 'Those who deny God cannot express their higher selves but only the lower; this is not full self-expression but a lesser form we call selfishness or self-absorption. See then the way to conquer self is simply to love God, then thou dost desire solely the Will of God and consequently thou hast conquered self and can be most fully self-expressed.' (p. 81).

H.D.A.M.

JOHN BULL CONSIDERS HIS CHURCH

It is often harder to make a short speech than a long one. Much the same applies to books. Archdeacon T. Dilworth-Harrison has attempted no mean task in his little book *John Bull considers his Church*[1], for he tries to give us both a history of the English Church and a summary of its doctrines, all within the space of a hundred or so pages. His choice of material for discussion is suggestive, and in the historical part at any rate, small fault can be found with his emphasis. Perhaps the chief danger in the book is that it will fail to satisfy those for whom it was written, just because of its many excellencies. For while to the learned the book is interesting though not informative, to the unlearned it may appear to lack clarity since so many connecting links in the argument must of necessity be omitted.

The Archdeacon's main contention is that in the twentieth century England is nominally a Christian country but with only a fragment of her population genuinely so, and that this has always been the case. There never was a time, so he maintains, when England was truly Christian. Always there has been the faithful remnant surrounded by an indifferent multitude of 'light half believers of their casual creeds.' In other words, we need not be unduly alarmed at the present situation, for it is what *a priori* we ought to expect. The fifty pages entitled 'The Structure' contain the evidence upon which this thesis is built.

It is good to find that the Archdeacon views history with the eyes of a Christian. For example, he commends William the Conqueror thus:

> 'William, apart from his war-like propensities, was a righteous king, with a profound sense of duty, a real interest in religion and a genuine reverence for good men. In a profligate age he was a faithful husband, and we know that he took pains to see that his children were instructed in the Christian faith.' (p. 8).

[1] *John Bull considers his Church*, by T. Dilworth-Harrison. (Longmans, 1952; 3/-.)

He continues:

> 'With the exception of Stephen, the next six kings were men of vicious life.' (p. 9).

How refreshing not to be told that Stephen was a weak king, Henry II a strong king, and Richard I a model of chivalry!

The footnote (p. 11), showing the way in which so many Archbishops of Canterbury have defended what they believed to be right against kings, popes and people, effectively gives the lie to the notion that the English Church has always been the willing and docile instrument of secular or foreign influence.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the author has found a scapegoat for the ills which beset the Church in the sixteenth century. He writes:

> 'The root tragedy was that the Renaissance, with which the spirit of sixteenth century secularism came to be identified, captured the patronage of the highest officials in the Church and State.' (p. 26).

To the Archdeacon humanism was, and presumably is, the enemy. He defines it thus:

> 'that system of thought which makes human culture, rather than Man's responsibility to his Creator, the accepted centre of his activity.' (p. 28).

Thirteen popes between 1450 and 1550, he says, were humanists, and it was this which finally led to the storm. In actual fact, it was the worldliness, immorality and commercial outlook of the Papacy which disgusted Europe — it was the aesthetic and intellectual attachment of individual popes to such high cultural standards, which almost saved the situation for the Roman hierarchy.

Mandell Creighton wrote of Pope Julius II:

> 'He had the true mark of greatness, that he sympathised with all that was great. (*Hist. of the Papacy*, Vol. 5, p. 194).

There is, in fact, a Christian humanism, which so far from precipitating might well have averted the catastrophe. Probably the strongest condemnation ever uttered against the worldliness of the clergy came from one such humanist, John Colet, while a second Christian humanist, William Warham occupied the See of Canterbury, and succeeded in stemming off the rising tide of violent reform, which his successor Thomas Cranmer so far from resisting actively, encouraged.

The Archdeacon has a respect for the Wesleys and the Methodist revival and has greater sympathy for them than for the Puritans. Incidentally Methodist Reunion took place in 1932 and not in 1935 as stated on page 46. He mentions but virtually by-passes the Evangelical and Broad Church contributions, and fixes his final attention on the Oxford Movement. Of the Tractarians he says:

> 'their aim was to recall men to the principles upon which the Church, as the Divinely instituted Society of Christ, rested, endowed as it was with supernatural powers, the appointed trustee of an unchanging faith. (p. 52).

After a reference to the work of the Church in the educational field and mention of the extension of her activities overseas, our author thus sums up the first half of his book:

> 'the legend that Britain was in any deep sense Christian has been evaporated . . . in every age Man's temptation has been to acknowledge God . . .

It has been his unerring instinct to substitute something less costly for God's demand that man should surrender his Way of Life to Him.' (pp. 58-59).

The Archdeacon then passes from 'The Structure' to 'The Foundations.' The doctrinal part of the book opens with a brief sketch of the origin and significance of the Old Testament, the Apocrypha, and the New Testament. We then pass to a section entitled 'Some great themes of the Bible.' These are regarded as five — Salvation, Atonement, Forgiveness, Sanctification and Grace. The doctrine of the Atonement outlined is not one which would be universally accepted, and as might be expected, the section on Forgiveness stresses overmuch the function of the priest.

There follows an interesting analysis of the vexed problem of suffering. He writes:

'Our Lord's greatest contribution to the problem of Suffering is His own Life. But He accepts the old teaching, so far as it goes, that unhappiness, disaster, death are the fruits of sin. He would be a bold man to deny that this does cover a vast number of cases. (p. 83).

There follows a final section on 'the Sacraments' which our author, a dutiful Anglo-Catholic, regards as seven. There are things in this part of the book with which one could disagree, notably regarding the act of consecration in the Holy Communion service, and also in the paragraphs on Marriage. The Archdeacon can subtly blend the lofty with the practical. Perhaps this is best exemplified by the following extract with which we close:

'The greatest contribution that any lay folk can make to the welfare of the State is the building of a Christian home, a truth that the Welfare State appears to have lost sight of, for anything that derogates from the influence of home is destructive of that Divine unit, and the inability, amongst so many and so great expenditure on Public Services, to speed up the building programme, means that hundreds of thousands of children are growing up without this influence, and that the nervous strain upon countless young married people who have no real privacy, and no room in which to expand, is leading with ever-increasing swiftness to the break-up of civilized society.' (p. 101).

GEOFFREY PARRISH

BRAINS TRUST

THE SYMBOLISM OF THE SIGNS IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Question from The Rev. C. L. Howell Thomas, The Vicarage, Marske-by-the-Sea, Redcar.

In a recent review of *Religious Instruction for the Non-Specialist*, by L. R. Phillips (John Murray) in the *Church Times* of May 2nd, 1952, it is stated:

(*a*) That the author 'makes the fatal assumption that St. John's "signs" are symbolic and, in some degree, imaginary.'

(*b*) 'No serious scholarship can accept the preposterous explanation that the feeding of the thousands consisted in Jesus making the multitudes share their rations. It is too childish to need comment.'

Would the Brains Trust give their opinion(s) on the adjectives 'fatal', 'preposterous' and 'childish'?

The Rev. D. L. Scott's reply

We are not told what it is to which the author's assumption is held to be fatal — whether to his own reputation, to a fundamentalist view of Scripture, or to a right understanding of St. John's Gospel. But it is evident that the reviewer considers the assumption to be ill founded, whatever the exact nature of its fatal consequences.

It is difficult however to see how a sign can be other than symbolic, and 'sign' is a word which St. John himself uses. Even so conservative a scholar as Westcott speaks of 'the symbolism of St. John' but he does not on that account call the historical nature of the signs into question. To suppose, as the reviewer appears to do, that symbolism and historicity must necessarily stand in antithesis to one another is surely a 'fatal assumption' to make.

Whether the signs are not only symbolic but also 'in some degree imaginary' is too large an issue to be dealt with here. But the difficulties of maintaining that St. John did not draw upon his imagination but confined himself to the narrating of what actually happened are too formidable and have been developed too often to be simply dismissed as a 'fatal assumption.' To take just one example: the raising of Lazarus is undoubtedly symbolic. St. John sees it as a sign that Jesus Christ is the resurrection and the life. But if it is historical — *i.e.* not 'in some degree imaginary' — how are we to account for the fact that the other three Evangelists omit all reference to so stupendous a miracle, especially since it was, according to St. John, the immediate cause of the Crucifixion? To assume on the strength of this omission that it is unhistorical may be right or wrong, but any belief or theory to which such an assumption would be 'fatal' would seem to be precarious indeed.

With regard to the 'explanation that the feeding of the thousands consisted in Jesus making the multitudes share their rations,' the reviewer is of course at liberty to consider it preposterous if he so chooses. But it is entirely wrong to say that no serious scholarship can accept it, since in fact many serious scholars have done so from the time of Paulus at the beginning of the last century until the present day. Recently it has been suggested as a possible explanation of the miracle by the Revd. P. Gardner-Smith (*The Christ of the Gospels*), and the case for it has been argued by Prof. A. D. Ritchie in *Civilization, Science and Religion* in a most persuasive way that is certainly neither 'preposterous' nor 'childish.'

To pretend that no serious scholarship disagrees with our own prejudices, and that an unwelcome point of view can be summarily rejected as 'too childish to need comment' is really a 'preposterous' attitude to adopt. It is fatal to reasoned discussion which might throw further light upon the question at issue. In fact it is eminently 'childish.'

The Rev. Dr. C. J. Wright's reply

I have seen neither the book nor the review referred to, and can therefore, only seek to answer the question as sent to me, being ignorant of what each really or fully said.

Adjectives such as 'fatal', 'preposterous' and 'childish,' in connection with the 'Symbolism of Signs' in *St. John*, have a ring of modern propaganda device — on the basis of the forensic trick, 'When you have no case, or are unhappy about it, abuse your opponent.'

(*a*) The first statement quoted compels me to ask: '"Fatal" to what?' My own answer would be that the refusal to recognise and frankly acknowledge 'symbolism' in the 'Sign' narratives of *St. John* is 'fatal' to intelligent understanding and to moral truthfulness.

As to the 'in some degree imaginary,' I am again at a loss, as I do not know precisely what the unknown reviewer meant by the adjective, nor how much, or how little, in the Scriptures he himself regards as 'imaginary.' It is necessary to remember here the exceeding great company of former 'defenders of the faith' who condemned in their day the 'fatal assumptions' that are now applauded, or used, by modern apologists. As so erudite and so sane a Christian scholar as the late Dr. Edwyn Bevan wrote in his Gifford Lectures:

> 'The story of the six days of creation, of the Garden of Eden and the talking snake, were taken by most Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, even in the days of our grandfathers, to be a literal account of events which took place about four thousand years B.C.'

And he went on to add:

> 'Even those who believe that the writer of these documents was divinely guided consider indeed that the story in some way stands for truth about the world and about man, but that its truth is symbolical, not literal.'

How many of the 'fatal assumptions' derided by former theologians are now sacrosanct verities! But the sons of the deriders are still with us.

(*b*) The second statement is suggestive of the same kind of uneasy defence. If I had before me the considered opinion of the reviewer about 'the feeding of the thousands' I should be in a position to answer the quoted statement. Not knowing what this opinion is, I can only say here that 'serious' students of these narratives of feeding think it probable that there were *many* in the large company referred to in the Gospels who exercised some forethought about bodily needs: and that to 'share' with the needy or the thoughtless is Christian. Such acknowledgement should be frankly made by all teachers of Scripture: though, of course, the interpretation of the narrative in *St. John* demands fuller and deeper thought and the recognition of other factors which I cannot now discuss.

I would add a few positive views.

I know of no serious scholar and thinker who does not recognise the 'symbolical' element of *St. John*, and pre-eminently in his 'Sign' narratives. The sooner this, with its implications, is humbly accepted and frankly taught the sooner will 'serious' enquirers listen to what Christian teachers have to say about the real questions troubling their minds and hearts. That devout, if timid, Roman Catholic scholar and thinker, the late Baron von Hügel, many years ago tried to teach reluctant traditionalists that there was inescapable symbolism and allegory in the 'Sign' narratives of the Fourth Gospel: in this he followed a lead given by distinguished predecessors of other Churches. The Lazarus story of chapter xi was, to him, a 'doctrinal allegory': I myself think it is better called a 'spiritual allegory.'

If such views are 'preposterous' to some, we must not forget that such an acknowledgement by von Hügel in the Roman Church and by many in the non-Roman Churches has been frequently silenced, evaded or forgotten, by official and other apologists: to the continued flight of the truth-loving from the Church and their indifference to its basic message.

CORRESPONDENCE

CIVITAS DEI

SIR,

I have read with deep interest *The Faith for the World's Need*, by the late Dr. Raymond C. Knox, in your issue for June, 1952.

You will probably have seen *The Spiritual Basis of Democracy*, by my friend Dr. Gillett, published by Blackwell. He, like Dr. Knox, holds that to create the Kingdom of God upon earth 'we must have a clear understanding of the Kingdom in terms intelligible to present day thought and experience.' I agree.

On page 123 Dr. Knox continues 'That the Kingdom of God may be more fully realised on earth in our day the first requisite is to repent, to advance to new and truer ways of thinking . . . Lincoln could say in his time "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present".'

On page 124 Dr. Knox quotes from the first edition of my book *Civitas Dei* published in 1937 which is now quite obsolete. After running through several editions it went out of print in 1939 when the war cut off the supplies of paper. As there was a widespread and continuous demand for it the Sir Halley Stewart Trust undertook to reprint it if I would bring it up to date, and to issue it at a price which students could afford. I made some corrections and omitted predictions I had made which had been verified by the war, and wrote five new chapters to bring the book up to date. The new and revised edition of *Civitas Dei* was printed and published for the Trust by George Allen & Unwin Ltd. (1949; 30/-).

Readers of *Civitas Dei* will see how closely I agree with what Dr. Knox says in his article. But he does not touch on the main points I was trying to make in *Civitas Dei*. The object I had in writing this book is exactly stated by Dr. Knox on page 123 when he writes 'That the Kingdom may be more fully realised on earth in our day the first requisite is . . . to advance to new and truer ways of thinking and to live consistently with this conviction.'

In chapter cxvii, pages 698-9, I explained what I meant by the Kingdom of God upon earth, as a structure of society based on the infinite duty of each to all. Its object was to develop in men the sense of duty in each to all. 'To increase and perfect this sense as the principle of life was the end and object of human existence. But this could not be done merely by teaching or preaching, nor yet by example, nor yet by prayer or intercourse with God. The structure of human society itself must be based on the laws of God, on realities. The supreme task was to bring into being an order of society in which the infinite duty of each to all was fully expressed, applied and called into exercise.'

The Kingdom of God as conceived by Christ could not be realised as 'One Holy Catholic Church' but as a Divine Commonwealth. Our Lord was founding not a Church but a polity, the nature of which would stamp itself on the characters of men as a seal is stamped on wax. The faith we need is the product of institutions based on realities, *i.e.* on the laws of God.

Reviews, so far as I have seen, have missed the two conclusions that Our Lord was founding not a Church but a polity which could be trusted to stamp itself on the characters of men who lived under it.

I submit that *The Modern Churchman* might say how far it accepts or rejects these conclusions.

All Souls' College, Oxford. LIONEL CURTIS.

We think the important issues raised by our correspondent in the last sentence of this letter could be most usefully discussed in the *Modern Churchman's* Brains Trust. (Ed. *M.C.*).

'ETERNITY'

SIR,

Mr. Hardwick in his note on Eternal Life in your issue of March, 1952, remarks that 'Eternity is an idea of which we can have no notion or experience.' Modern broadcasting, it seems to me, gives us some idea of its meaning. Take the Royal Broadcast on Christmas Day as an example. From the speaker's point of view he is speaking to *all places at one time*. From the listeners' point of view they are listening *at all times to one place*. If we put the two points of view together time and space appear to be eliminated which is the meaning of Eternity.

J. H. HINGSTON
Archdeacon of Cork

St. John's Vicarage,
Infirmary Road, Cork.

MR. HARDWICK'S REPLY

I cannot agree with the Archdeacon of Cork's view that a broadcast heard all over the world can supply us with the experience, or notion, of eternity. His late Majesty's broadcast was heard all over the world at the same time. But owing to different parts of our planet being at that time differently illuminated by the sun, due to that planet's revolutions, the clock-time registered in the various places varied. But clock-time is only a convention, an arrangement whereby the hours of daylight are measured off. I would maintain that the broadcast was heard by everybody everywhere at the same moment, though the clocks in the various places might register different hours of the day or night.

I still maintain that we can have no clear notion of eternity because our normal experience is of space and of time. The mystics claim, I think justifiably, to have experience of eternity; but no mystic, in trying to 'explain' or describe it, would associate it in any way with time. The two things belong to different orders of experience.

HAYFIELD GROUP PRAYER BOOK REVISION

SIR,

May I be allowed to comment on the excellent little book of *Prayer Book Revision Suggestions*, 1950, compiled by the 'Hayfield' Group? It is sincerely to be hoped that their endeavours will be followed up, and many of their suggestions adopted, by those who are convinced that the revision of our traditional forms of service for Sunday morning and evening is a vital and urgent priority if the task of evangelism is to be effectively carried out.

It would be interesting to have the views and opinions of those who have tried out, for example, 'An Evening Service,' as outlined in the book. Some will no doubt feel it a pity that in this case the compilers have included the usual Canticles, which do not really fit in with the scheme here suggested. The prayers of dedication could surely be more effectively used at the end of the service rather than the middle. And some will regret that the words 'Lesson' and 'Collect' (which convey little to minds not familiar with Prayer Book phraseology) have been retained.

These, however, are small points. I write chiefly to express the hope that the work of the 'Hayfield' Group, which seems to have received little publicity, may not be allowed to go the way of other similar efforts in the past.

KENNETH BUDD (Rev.)

Holy Trinity Vicarage,
Trinity Crescent, S.W.17.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ASSUMPTION

SIR,

Ever since the Papal promulgation of the doctrine of the Assumption, critics or defenders of the doctrine have argued on certain definite lines. The Archbishops of Canterbury and York have criticised the doctrine on the ground that there is no Scriptural evidence for it. Roman Catholic apologists have defended it by pointing out its religious or moral value. As far as I know, very little has been said about the original form of the story.

Dr. Montague James, in his *Apocryphal New Testament*, gives various versions in Coptic dialects, and suggests that the legend may have originated in Egypt about the second century A.D. In a homily attributed to Evodius, first Bishop of Antioch (*circ.* 100-110 A.D.) it is asserted that the Virgin Mary died, and Jesus appeared and ascended again with Mary's soul in the chariot of the Cherubim. Seven months later Jesus returned and reclaimed the Virgin's body and then departed again to Heaven. The same story is repeated by Theodosius, Patriarch of Alexandria (536-568), but of course the evidence is much later.

What is the source of the story? I doubt if it is derived from Egyptian mythology. I think that it is due to the tendency to assimilate the life of the Virgin to that of Christ. The Immaculate Conception is a parallel to the Virgin Birth, the Virgin is presented in the Temple in the same way as Christ, and finally the Assumption is a parallel to the Ascension. If anyone can accept the story of the Assumption, he must be impervious to rational argument.

L. PATTERSON

St. George's Vicarage, W.8.

THE CREDAL BASIS AND THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

SIR,

Your readers will remember that the credal basis of the World Council of Churches is that it consists of those churches that acknowledge 'Jesus Christ as God and Saviour.' In view of this, it should interest your readers to know that at the latest meeting of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Australia (Melbourne, September, 1951), when the report of the representatives on the World Council of Churches was submitted, among other motions the following was carried (Minute 187, Clause 10, page 44, General Assembly Blue Book, 1951):

> 'That the Assembly request the World Council of Churches to consider the alteration of the credal basis by substituting for the words "which acknowledge Jesus Christ as God and Saviour" one of the following:
> (*a*) which acknowledge that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself;
> (*b*) which acknowledge Jesus Christ as Lord, to the glory of God the Father;
> (*c*) which acknowledge that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God;
> (*d*) (some other formula).'

May I make the comment that it is difficult to find a credal basis that will be generally acceptable? But it is to be hoped that a sincere effort will be made to find a credal basis more generally acceptable than is the present basis.

E. H. VINES

The Manse, Turramurra,
N.S.W., Australia.

ARE THE BISHOPS GUARDIANS OF ORTHODOXY?

SIR,

In your editorial in *The Modern Churchman* for June, 1952 (p.78) you describe the Bishops as 'the Guardians of Orthodoxy.' May I, however, put to you a question? Is it true that the bishops are the guardians of orthodoxy?

If orthodoxy is not synonymous with ignorance but is to grow with the new learning why does it need a guardian? Science needs no guardians, neither does philosophy nor any other truth. Truth needs only freedom and ultimately wends its own way.

When the Archbishop of Canterbury, on his recent visit at the time of our General Convention, was asked about these inherent rights, he replied in the Church of England there are no inherent rights in the episcopate.

JOHN HOWARD MELISH

Kelheet, Lake George,
New York.

EDITOR'S REPLY

The Bishop has no inherent rights in the matter of orthodoxy but he has essential duties. At the consecration of a Bishop in the Church of England he is asked by the Archbishop:

> 'Are you ready, with all faithful diligence, to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine contrary to God's Word; and both privately and openly to call upon and encourage others to the same? Answer. 'I am ready, the Lord being my helper.'

In Church History it is the priesthood and not the episcopate which has made the most precious contributions in time of doctrinal crises. But besides the efforts of the inspired individual the cause of truth has gained much from the efforts of societies (*e.g.* the Royal Society) which provide continuity of successive research and the aid of mutual criticism.

The guidance into all the truth promised by Christ entails the development of orthodoxy and therefore Christians have to be conscious that although there is an essential continuity yet the formulation of the orthodoxy of the future will necessarily differ in form from the orthodoxy of the past. Its motto therefore must be, whether for bishops or laymen, *Non nova sed nove.*

THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN, 1953

The 1953 Annual Modern Churchmen's Conference will be held at St. Anne's College, Oxford, from Monday, September 14th, to Friday, September 18th.

All applications for tickets should be addressed to the Hon. Sec. of the Conference: Miss Irene Walker, F.R.Hist.S., Churchill Court, Churchill, Near Bristol.